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Insurance Fraud through Collusion between Policyholders
and Car Dealers: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Pierre Picard Kili C. Wangy
Abstract
We analyze, from theoretical and empirical standpoints, how insurance distribution
channels may a¤ect fraud when policyholders and service providers collude. The empiri-
cal analysis focuses on the Taiwan automobile insurance market. Striking forms of claims
manipulation exist in this market: opportunistic policyholders tend to manipulate claim
dates to reduce the burden of deductibles and to take advantage of the bonus-malus
mechanism. We focus our attention on the role of dealer-owned agents (DOAs), since
they have informational and bargaining advantages when faced with insurers and may
be tempted to encourage collusion between their car repairers and policyholders. We
develop an optimal contract model with claim auditing, where contracts are sold either
through DOAs or through standard independent agents, and where policyholders and
car repairers may collude to manipulate claims. We also use a database from the largest
Taiwanese insurance company to test for the relevance of theoretical predictions. In
particular, we verify that fraud occurs through the postponing of claims to the end of
the policy year, possibly by ling one single claim for several events, and we show that
the fraud rate is larger among policyholders who purchase insurance through the DOA
channel than among other policyholders.
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acknowledges 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1 Introduction
Claims fraud is widely considered to be an important source of ine¢ ciency in insurance
markets, and deterring or detecting fraud is of crucial importance for the insurance industry.
In particular, the collusion between policyholders and service providers (e.g., car repairers or
health care providers) facilitates the falsication of claims, and it is one of the most important
factors that encourage fraudulent practices.1 This is similar to other fraud schemes in vertical
relationships, such as discount fraud and warranty fraud, which are facilitated by retailers.2,3
Such frauds are instances of customer misbehavior that involve collusion with retailers or
frontline employees at the expense of producers and, ultimately, of honest customers.4
In this paper, we further analyze how the collusion between policyholders and service
providers facilitates fraud. Our empirical focus is on the Taiwan automobile insurance market
and on the role of car dealer-owned insurance agents (DOAs) in this market. In Taiwan,
a large percentage of automobile insurance contracts are sold through DOAs. Thus, DOAs
sell not only cars, but also automobile insurance to their clients, and furthermore most of
them own an auto repair shop. Understandably, the multi-faceted activity of DOAs and
their long-term connection with car owners favor the creation of a mutually advantageous
1The fact that the alliance between patients and physicians may lead to health care overspending is
well documented in the health economics literature on ex-post moral hazard. Although medical ex-post
moral hazard is not stricto sensu a fraudulent behavior, it highlights the importance of the policyholder-
service provider coalition, and how this coalition may jeopardize the e¢ ciency of social or private risk-
sharing mechanisms. See Alger and Ma (2003) on the deterrence of collusion between policyholders and
service providers when some providers are collusive and others are honest. When there is a risk of collusion,
the contractual relationship between insurers and service providers may improve the e¢ ciency of resource
allocation, for instance through a¢ liated service provider networks, such as managed care organizations
for health insurance (e.g., HMO and PPO in the USA) or Direct Repair Programs (DRP) for automobile
insurance. See Gal-Or (1997) and Ma and McGuire (1997, 2002) on managed health care and Bourgeon et
al. (2008) on a¢ liated service provider networks.
2Discount fraud exploits the special discounts that companies may o¤er under particular circumstances,
for instance when discounted products are used for a specic purpose, e.g., educational use for softwares.
Although large scale discount fraud perpetrated by criminal enterprises does exist (in 2010, defrauders were
sentenced to ve years in prison and ordered to pay Microsoft $20 million in restitution for discount fraud),
it probably remains exceptional. Small scale discount fraud involving collusion between retailers (who may
guarantee the legitimacy of the discount) and opportunistic purchasers is probably much more widespread,
although it is di¢ cult to evaluate its cost.
3There are several patterns of warranty fraud (or service abuse). One of them exploits certain warranty
policies that allow the end client to receive replacement parts for a product before returning the defective
components, thus without verication that they were original products. Warranty fraud also occurs when a
service provider, e.g., a car repairer, replaces a defective part with a new spare part and triggers the producers
warranty, although the defective part was not original and thus was not protected by the warranty.
4See Harris and Daunt (2013) on managerial strategies under the risk of customer misbehavior. Murthy
and Djamaludin (2002) survey the literature on new product warranty. Insu¢ cient maintenance e¤ort by
buyers and inadequate behavior of retailers are at the origin of a double moral hazard problem in warranty
management. This is a particular case of transaction costs induced by the delegation of services to retailers;
see Rey (2003) for an introductory survey.
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policyholder-DOA alliance.
With the Taiwan case in mind, we will analyze the interaction between policyholders, car
repairers and insurers when policyholders and repairers may collude to manipulate claims and
insurers attempt to detect fraud through claims auditing. To do so, we will rst elaborate
a model that shows why deductible contracts and the bonus-malus system may provide
incentives to falsify claims, and also why DOAs may lead to higher fraud rates. In short,
claims auditing is all the more costly when collusion is more di¢ cult to detect, which is
particularly the case for DOAs. In addition, should irregularities be detected by the insurer,
DOAs have greater bargaining power than standard insurance agents because their market
share (per agent) is larger, and they have a more captive clientele base, which they can
credibly redirect toward another insurer. This may deter insurers from enforcing penalties
against them, hence higher equilibrium fraud rates when claims are led through DOAs than
through standard insurance agents. This is reinforced in the case of deductible contracts,
because deductibles weaken the insurers incentives to monitor claims. Furthermore, the
policyholders who intend to renew their contracts with the same insurer at the end of the
policy year are even more incentivized to defraud because of specicities of the Taiwanese
bonus-malus system.
This will lead us to an empirical analysis based on a database of automobile physical
damage insurance obtained from the largest insurance company in Taiwan. This data in-
cludes all of the policyholders who have led a claim in 2010, amounting to nearly 11,000
les. Our results sustain the prediction that fraud is greater when insurance policies have
been sold through DOAs than through other distribution channels, and also that deductibles
stimulate fraud.
This can be likened to the conclusions of Dionne and Gagné (2001). Using data from
Québec, they showed that the amount of the deductible is a signicant determinant of the
reported loss when no other vehicle is involved in the accident which led to the claim, and
thus when the presence of witnesses is less likely. Miyazaki (2009) also focuses on the e¤ect
of deductibles on insurance fraud. He shows through an experimental study that higher
deductibles result in a weaker perception that claim padding is an unethical behavior, and
thus in a larger propensity toward fraud. In this paper, we link deductibles to the falsication
of the number of claims and of the claim date (ling one claim for two accidents and /or
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postponing claims to the last month of the policy year to take advantage of specic features
of the Taiwanese bonus-malus system). Furthermore, we focus attention on the role of the
policyholder-car repairer coalition and provide empirical evidence on the impact of such a
coalition on the intensity of insurance fraud.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides further
motivation for our analysis. We introduce some factual observations that should convince the
reader that there is a signicant degree of claim manipulation in the Taiwanese car insurance
market, and we describe regular fraud patterns. Section 3 develops our theoretical model
to include claims auditing and the policyholder-car repairer coalition. Section 4 describes
the data. Section 5 presents our empirical approach and discusses our results. Section 6
concludes. Complementary developments and mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Motivation
DOAs hold a substantial market share in the Taiwan automobile insurance market. For the
insurance company that provides the base of our empirical analysis, 50.78% of vehicle damage
insurance is sold through DOAs.5 Furthermore, DOAs own the list of their customers,
which increases their bargaining power when they negotiate contractual deals with insurance
companies or when insurers monitor claims. An insurer who discovers a claim manipulation
by a DOA may indeed hesitate to take retaliatory actions because of this strategic advantage
of DOAs, who can choose to switch to another insurer.6 In addition, DOAs also act as car
repairers, and this position provides them with an informational advantage: establishing that
a claim has been falsied is particularly di¢ cult and costly when it has been led through a
DOA.
Our study is also related to the specic forms of automobile insurance fraud in Taiwan.
5More precisely, 67.52% of type A contracts, 84,19% of type B contracts, and 43.71% of type C contracts
are sold by DOAs. Read further for additional information on the three types of insurance contracts in
Taiwan.
6On average, DOAs sell more policies than other agents (three times more on average and considerably more
for the largest DOAs), and their market power is particularly signicant for deductible contracts. They are
independent agents, and, as emphasized by Mayers and Smith (1981), this status gives them more discretion
in claim administration (e.g., they may intercede on behalf of their customers at the claim settlement stage)
because they can credibly threaten to switch their business from one insurer to another. Actually, DOAs
provide comparatively less stable customers to insurers than other insurance agents, with continuation rates
(i.e., the fraction of customers who keep purchasing insurance from the same insurer one year after the other)
which are about sixty percent for DOAs and seventy to eighty percent for other insurance agents.
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Li et al. (2013) have observed that a large proportion of automobile insurance claims are
led during the last months of the policy year. This is conrmed by our own database.
Figure 1 presents the percentage distribution of claims and the average cost of claims (in
hundred US dollars) over the twelve policy months. The heavy concentration of claims in
the last month of the policy year is striking. Policy years and calendar years do not coincide
and, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, the concentration of claims during the last months of
the policy year is compatible with seasonal uctuations in the number of claims over the
calendar year, with peaks during vacation months (January, March, July and December).
In addition, the average claim amount slightly decreases in the nal policy months. Li et
al. (2013) interpret this phenomena as a "premium recouping e¤ect": some policyholders
without accident during the previous months tend to le false smaller claims during the
last month of the policy year in order to recoup a part of their premium. They might do
so to express their feeling that they have been unfairly treated by the insurance company.
Whatever the interpretation we may have in mind, this distribution of claims over time
strongly suggests that claim ling is manipulated by a signicant number of policyholders.
(Insert Figures 1,2 and 3 here)
Some factual information is needed to identify the factors that may lead policyholders to
manipulate claims. There are three di¤erent types of automobile physical damage insurance
contracts in Taiwan: types A, B and C. Type A and B contracts cover all kinds of collision
and non-collision losses, with more exclusions for B than for A,7 while type-C contracts only
cover the damages incurred in a collision involving two or more vehicles. Contracts also
di¤er in terms of indemnity: Type A contracts o¤er low coverage with a deductible, type B
contracts may be purchased with or without deductible, and nally type C contracts provide
full coverage without deductible. Claims are per accident, with a specic deductible for each
claim. The change in premium is ruled by a bonus-malus system when policyholders renew
their contracts with the same insurance company, with a no-claim discount and an increase
in premium proportional to the number of claims, without reference to their severity. The
policyholders who switch to another insurance company bargain with this company about
the new starting point of the bonus-malus record
7Type B contracts cover all the areas of type-A contracts, except the non-collision losses caused by inten-
tional damage, vandalism, and any unidentied reasons.
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In this setting, opportunist policyholders may take advantage of manipulating claims
for several reasons. According to the premium recouping interpretation of Li et al. (2013),
defrauders are more likely to be among the policyholders who do not plan to keep a long term
relationship with the same insurance company if, on average, such policyholders feel a lower
moral cost of defrauding.8 In our empirical analysis, this will lead us to dene a "recoup
group" RG that includes the policyholders who have not renewed their contract more than
one year after the policy year under consideration.9
The bonus-malus system and the per-claim deductibles also provide incentives to defraud.
Firstly, the claims led during the last month of policy year t are not registered in the bonus-
malus record of year t+1 (they will be taken into account in the premium paid in year t+2),
and consequently, the policyholders who plan to renew their contract with the same insurer
may be incited to postpone their claim to the last policy month, in order to delay the
increase in premium.10 Secondly, since the bonus-malus record depends on the number of
claims and not on their severity, policyholders may be prompted to le one unique claim for
two accidents, should a second accident occur. This is even more protable in the case of
deductible contracts, since deductibles are per-claim: the strategy that consists of postponing
the rst claim and merging any other accident with the rst one within a unique claim yields
full coverage for the part of the year that follows the rst accident. Type A and B contracts
are particularly subject to this kind of claims manipulation, because they include coverage
for losses other than those associated with the collision between two cars. In our empirical
analysis, the set of policyholders who renew their contract with the same insurer will be called
the "suspicious group" SG because of this incentive to manipulate the bonus-malus system,
with subgroups SG1 and SG2 for no-deductible and deductible contracts, respectively.
If we conjecture that some claims led in the last policy month correspond in fact to
postponed claims with the cumulated losses of two events, then we should expect that the
ratio of "the average cost of rst claims" over "the average cost of all claims" (hereafter
8 It is well known that insurance fraud is often associated with the feeling that the insurance company is
unfair; see Fukukawa et al. (2007), Miyazaki (2009) and Tennyson (1997, 2002). The premium recouping
phenomenon could reect a kind of resentment against insurers, particularly from policyholders who have not
led any claim during the policy year.
9Because of the bonus-malus system (see below), the policyholders who renew their contract only one year
have the same incentive to defraud as the policyholders who switch insurers at the end of the policy year.
10 In addition, the bonus-malus system forgives the rst accident for drivers who have had no other accidents
for three years, which provides an even larger manipulation gain.
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called the rst claim cost ratio) should increase during this month. Note however that this
prediction could also be interpreted as the outcome of a moral hazard mechanism: this would
be the case if a rst accident made drivers more cautious, and thus they have less severe
accidents should a second accident occur during the same policy year. To disentangle these
two explanations, we may consider type C contracts as a benchmark to isolate the moral
hazard e¤ect, since claims manipulation is unlikely for such a contract.11 Figure 4 conrms
our intuition: the rst claim cost ratios for SG1 and SG2 signicantly jump in the last
month, and this is not the case for type C policies.
(Insert Figure 4 here)
At this stage, we may come back to the part played by DOAs. Figure 5 conrms that
DOAs may favor the manipulation of claims. While the claims led by the policyholders of
the two suspicious groups, SG1 and SG2, are signicantly concentrated in the last policy
month, this pattern is even more obvious for the policyholders of each subgroup that have
purchased insurance from DOAs. Figure 5 also shows that the last policy month pattern
is much less obvious in the benchmark group, which includes those policyholders who are
covered by no-deductible contracts and who have not renewed their contract with the same
insurance company at the end of the policy year.
(Insert Figure 5 here)
3 The model
3.1 Setting
We consider an economy with a competitive insurance market, in which automobile insurance
can be purchased either through car dealers who act as insurance agents (DOAs) or through
independent insurance agents. Car dealers also own auto repair shops. Accidents may be
minor or serious, with repair costs ` and 2` whatever the car repairer, for minor and serious
11Type C contracts only cover the risk of collision. Thus, their claims involve a third party, which makes
manipulation di¢ cult.
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accidents respectively, and also an uninsurable loss " per accident.12 Insurance policies
consist of a premium P and possibly a deductible d for each accident.13 Insurance pricing
includes constant proportional loading , and insurers may o¤er di¤erent policies through
car dealers and through other distribution channels.
Each individual may su¤er from 0, 1 or 2 accidents during the period covered by the
insurance contract.14 Let 1 and 2 be respectively the probability of 1 and 2 accidents,
with 0 < 1+2 < 1. Each accident is minor with probability qm and serious with probability
qs, with qm+qs = 1. There are two types of individuals with the same initial wealth w: type
1 has a smaller degree of absolute risk aversion than type 2. Let wf be the individuals nal
wealth. uh(wf ) denotes the type h von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (with h = 1
or 2), and we assume u0h > 0 and u
00
h < 0, and
 u
00
1(wf )
u01(wf )
<  u
00
2(wf )
u02(wf )
;
for all wf . Let h be the proportion of type h individuals, with 1 + 2 = 1. Car repairers
are risk neutral.
We also assume that individuals have di¤erentiated preferences between purchasing in-
surance through a car dealer or through an independent agent. In particular, individuals who
12Assuming that the insurable costs of serious accidents exactly double those of minor accidents simplies
the notations of the model. We could more generally assume than serious accidents cost more than minor
accidents. The repair shop market is competitive, so that policyholders can let their car be repaired at
competitive price ` or 2` whatever the insurance distribution channel. The uninsurable loss " corresponds to
earnings losses, time value, daily life disruption or stress incurred in the case of an accident. This loss does
not play a signicant role in our theoretical analysis, but it makes it possible for some individuals to choose a
deductible contract while others prefer a full coverage contract (in what follows, the type 1 and 2 individuals
respectively), which will t our empirical analysis of the Taiwan automobile insurance market. The fact that
the uninsurable loss does not depend on the size of the accident simply reects notational simplicity. More
generally, we could assume that the individualswealth is a¤ected simultaneously by the insurable cost of
accidents and by an uninsurable correlated background risk.
13The fact that deductibles are per accident follows the usual practice of car insurance companies (of course
not only in Taiwan), although it does not correspond to an optimal insurance contract design. This feature of
automobile insurance probably reects the increase in transaction costs that would be induced by aggregate
deductibles over the whole period covered by the contract. We exclude overcoverage, such as because of moral
hazard, and thus we have d  0. For simplicity, we assume that the deductible is the same for the rst and
second claims. In Taiwan, second claims have larger deductibles than the rst one that occurred during the
same policy year. This increase in the level of deductible may be viewed as an incentive device in a moral
hazard setting (see Li et al, 2007). The present model could be extended to a setting where deductibles would
di¤er between rst and second claims, without a¤ecting our qualitative conclusions.
14Thus, we assume that policyholders cannot have more than two accidents during the policy year. A
possible justication for this assumption is that three accidents or more would reveal an abnormal behavior
on the part of drivers that would lead insurers to deny the renewal of the contract at the end of the policy year,
which would induce large transaction costs to the policyholder. If two accidents occur, then the policyholder
would make unusual e¤ort (e.g., greatly reducing the use of his car) that would allow him to avoid any
additional accidents during the same policy year.
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have high search costs may prefer to purchase insurance through car dealers because often
purchasing a new car goes together with taking out a new insurance policy. This is modelled
as in a Hotelling game. Both types of individuals are uniformly located on the interval [0; 1].
A representative DOA and another representative independent insurance agent are located
at the extremities of the [0; 1] segment: the DOA is at x = xD = 0 and owns a repair shop,
while the the other distribution channel is at x = xA = 1.
Purchasing insurance entails a search disutility which is proportional at rate t to the
distance covered to 0 and 1 according to the distribution channel. Thus, the expected utility
of a type h customer located at x 2 [0; 1] with contract (P; d) is written as
uh(P; d)  t jx  xij ;
where
uh(P; d)  (1  1  2)uh(w P ) + 1uh(w P   d  ") + 2uh(w P   2d  2"); (1)
for h = 1 or 2, with i = D if that customer purchases insurance through the representative
DOA and i = A if he goes through the other distribution channel.15
Type 2 individuals have a larger propensity to purchase insurance coverage than type
1 because they are more risk averse. Because of these di¤erentiated preferences, insurers
o¤er menus of contracts. Let (Pih; dih) be the insurance contract that is taken out by type
h individuals, with i = A or D according to the distribution channel.16
3.2 The fraud mechanism
Fraud is analyzed as the behavior of oppportunistic policyholders who delay their claims to
the last month of the policy year, with the complicity of a car repairer. We consider a very
15We assume that the degree of risk aversion and the preference between the two distribution channels are
independently distributed among the population.
16 In practice, deductibles and premiums do not di¤er in Taiwan whether the contract is purchased through
D or through A. Note however indemnities and premiums may include a less easily observed (or implicit)
dimension associated either with delays or conditions in the payment of indemnities. For instance, given the
value of time, a longer delay between the ling of the claim and the payment of the indemnity is equivalent
to a larger deductible. In this perspective, empirical facts suggest that this delay is shorter for D than for
A. In other terms, policyholders may actually benet from a more generous coverage plan if their contract
has been purchased through a dealer-owned agent than through another distribution channel, although the
contractual indemnity is the same in both cases.
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simple form of the opportunistic policyholder-car repairer collusive game. The policyholder
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the car repairer in which he o¤ers to pay a xed amount
G to the repairer and he keeps the residual part of the collusive gain. Because of the
bonus-malus system, type 1 and 2 policyholders may commit such a fraud in order to avoid
paying a higher premium during the next policy year, and we denote as v the discounted
value of the savings in future insurance premiums induced by such a bonus-malus fraud.17
Only those individuals who plan to renew their contract with the same insurer may prot
from such a bonus-malus fraud. We assume that they make up a proportion  2 (0; 1) of
the policyholders (whatever their type). The last month of the policy year will be called
the "suspicious period", because ling a claim during this period may be a signal of fraud.
Accidents occur during the suspicious period with probability  2 (0; 1).18
We also assume that postponing a minor claim to the suspicious period requires that an-
other minor loss actually occurs during this period, so that the total losses may be presented
as the outcome of a single major accident. Policyholders also get an additional advantage
from fraud by reducing the retained cost from 2dih to dih. Thus, if fraud has been commit-
ted and is not detected, the collusive gain is dih + v, and it is shared between repairer and
policyholder as amounts G and dih + v  G respectively.
Thus, if a minor accident occurs during the non-suspicious period, then the policyholder
may decide not to immediately le a claim for this accident. Two possible cases are then
possible.19 If another minor accident occurs in the suspicious period, then the policyholder
may decide to le a single large claim for the two accidents (called a "fraudulent claim" in
what follows), which requires collusion with a car repairer. Auditing large claims led during
the suspicious period allows the insurer to detect such instances of fraud. We denote as ci
the cost of an audit when insurance is purchased from i 2 fD;Ag. The fact that the car
dealer owns the repair shop makes collusion all the easier. Thus, we assume that auditing
17 In Taiwan, bonus-malus fraud is protable for the policyholder for two reasons: rstly, because claims
led during the suspicious period will a¤ect the premium with a one-year time lag, and secondly because the
bonus-malus record only depends on the number of claims and not on their severity. For simplicity, we here
aggregate these nancial benets derived from fraud and we assume that they have a common value for all
policyholders.
18Thus,  = 1=12 if accidents are uniformly spread throughout the year.
19Bear in mind that in what follows we neglect the possibility of more than two accidents for the same
policyholder. We also assume that there are only two types of acccidents (minor or serious) with repair costs
of ` and 2`, respectively. Thus, we do not contemplate the possibility of presenting, say, a minor accident
and a serious accident as an extreme accident with cost 3`. In other words, the falsication of claims only
consists of announcing one single serious accident instead of two minor accidents.
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claims is more costly (or, put di¤erently, it is more di¢ cult to establish colluders fraud)
when insurance is purchased from D than from A.20 We thus assume cD > cA. If no minor
accident occurs in the suspicious period (i.e., if no other accident occurred or if it occurred
during the non-suspicious period), then the insurer considers that any late claim is invalid
and is dismissed.21
If a policyholder is caught ling a fraudulent claim through a collusive agreement with the
repairer, then he has to pay a ne B, and he does not receive a indemnity, and the repairer
pays a ne B0.22 In practice, when fraud is discovered, the policyholder-repairer coalition
has some bargaining power that may allow its members to escape the penalties. This is
particularly the case when insurance has been purchased from a DOA, because the latter is
in a position to threaten the insurer with redirecting its (presumably large) customer base
toward another insurer. This is another reason why deterring fraud may be more di¢ cult
when insurance has been taken out through a DOA than through a standard agent. The
e¤ects of agents bargaining power on the enforcement of fraud penalties is analyzed in
Appendix 2, and for the sake of presentation simplicity is not taken into account here.
3.3 Fraud-audit interaction
Let ih 2 [0; 1] be the fraud rate of type h 2 f1; 2g individuals who purchase inurance from
i 2 fA;Dg. This is the fraction of type h policyholders who decide not to immediately le a
claim when a minor accident occurs in the non-suspicious period, hoping for a future collusive
agreement with a car repairer, should another minor accident occur in the suspicious period.23
Let b = 2=(1 + 2) be the probability of having a second accident, conditionally on the
occurence of a rst accident in the non-suspicious period.24 Such an accident will occur in
the suspicious period with probability , and it will be minor with probability qm. Thus, if a
20For example, in the DOA case, the hidden transfer G may take the form of a promise to purchase a new
car in the near future.
21This is a somewhat extreme assumption made for the sake of simplicity. A more realistic setting would
consist of assuming that the policyholder can pretend to be in good faith. In that case, (depending on the
circumstances of the accident) the law of insurance contracts would lead the insurer to consider that the
claim is valid or invalid with some probabilities. Our modelling could be extended in this direction without
qualitative change to the conclusions.
22B and B0 may also be interpreted as the litigation costs incurred by the policyholder and the car repairer
when fraud is discovered.
23We may check that policyholders would not take advantage of colluding with a repairer if a second accident
occurs during the non-suspicious period.
24For simplicity, we do not condition this probability on the exact date at which the rst accident occurs.
In other words, we consider the non-suspicious period as a whole.
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rst minor acccident occurs in the non-suspicious period, then a future collusive agreement
with a car repairer will be possible with probability qmb. The audit of serious claims in
the suspicious period may detect such fraud. These audits are triggered with probability
ih 2 [0; 1].25 In short, ih and ih for i = A;D and h = 1; 2 are the policyholders and
insurers strategies, respectively.
The expected utility of a type h policyholder who does not immediately le a claim after
a rst (minor) accident in the non-suspicious period is written as26
EuFih = qmb[(1  ih)uh(w   Pih   dih   2"+ v  G) + ihuh(w   Pih   2`  2" G B)]
+(1  qmb)[buh(w   Pih   `  dih   2") + (1  b)uh(w   Pih   `  ")]:
If the policyholder does not immediately le a claim after a minor accident in the non-
suspicious period, he will have the opportunity to defraud (i.e., to le a single large claim
in the suspicious period) with probability qmb. In that case, either the claim is audited or
not, respectively with probabilities ih and 1 ih. If there is no audit, then the policyholder
receives dih+ v G, which is his share of the collusive deal, in addition to his status quo net
wealth w   Pih   2dih (i.e., the policyholders wealth in the case of two accidents without
fraud). If there is an audit, then no indemnity is paid by the insurer, and the policyholder
pays the ne B and does not recoup his side-payment G. If no fraudulent claim can be led,
then the late claim is dismissed: no insurance indemnity is paid for this claim, and any other
accident (which occurs with probability b) leads to another claim.
If the policyholder immediately les a claim after his rst minor accident, then his ex-
pected utility (after this rst accident) is
EuNih = buh(w   Pih   2dih   2") + (1  b)uh(w   Pih   dih   "):
25We will assume that all serious claims (for i and h given) are audited with the same probability ih.
In other words, the audit frequency is not conditional on whether the claim is led during the suspicious
or non-suspicious period. This seems to be a realistic assumption insofar as the beginning of the policy
year varies across individuals, and conditioning auditing on the date of the claim in the policy year of each
individual would probably entail substantial transaction costs. Be that as it may, concentrating audits on the
suspicious period individual by individual would increase the e¢ ciency of the fraud deterrence mechanism,
but this would not qualitatively a¤ect our conclusions.
26The formula would be almost unchanged if the rst accident also occurs in the suspicious period. In such
a case, the gain from collusion would be lower (v should be replaced by a lower collusive gain v0) because the
advantage from bonus-malus fraud would be lower. Consequently, defrauding by ling a single claim for two
minor accidents in the suspicious period does not occur for the equilibrium audit strategy.
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The policyholder is willling to defraud by making a side-payment G to the car repairer
if EuFih  EuNih, that is if ih  	h(Pih; dih; G), where
	h(Pih; dih; G) =
qmbuh(w   Pih   dih   2"+ v  G)
qmb[uh(w   Pih   dih   2"+ v  G)  uh(w   Pih   2`  2" G B)]
+
(1  qmb)[buh(w   Pih   `  dih   2") + (1  b)uh(w   Pih   `  ")]
qmb[uh(w   Pih   dih   2"+ v  G)  uh(w   Pih   2`  2" G B)]
  buh(w   Pih   2dih   2") + (1  b)uh(w   Pih   dih   ")
qmb[uh(w   Pih   dih   2"+ v  G)  uh(w   Pih   2`  2" G B)] :
We observe that 	h(Pih; dih; G) < 0 if dih = v = 0, which reects the obvious fact that
no audit is required to dissuade fraud if the defrauders have nothing to earn by postponing
their claims. If dih and/or v are large enough for auditing to be necessary, then we have
	h(Pih; dih; G) 2 (0; 1) and @	h=@G < 0. We focus on this case in what follows. The repairer
agrees to collude if his expected gain from collusion is positive, that is, if
G  ihB0  0:
The optimal side-payment o¤er from the policyholder to the car repairer is thus G = ihB
0.
The policyholder is indi¤erent between defrauding (through an optimal hidden agreement
with the car repairer) and not defrauding if ih = 	h(Pih; dih; ihB
0). This equation has a
single solution ih = 

ih(Pih; dih) 2 (0; 1) with ih > 	h(Pih; dih; ih) i¤ ih > ih(Pih; dih).
We thus have ih = 1 - respect. ih 2 (0; 1); ih = 0 - if ih < ih - respect. ih =
ih; ih > 

ih. Hence 

ih is the audit probability (for serious claims) above which type h
individuals and repairers are deterred from colluding, when insurance has been purchased
through distribution channel i.
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3.4 Equilibrium fraud and audit
Let L1 and L2 be the expected repair costs, conditionally upon the occurrence of one or two
accidents respectively, with27
L1 = (qm + 2qs)`;
L2 = 2(q
2
m + 2q
2
s + 3qmqs)`:
The expected cost of claims may be written as
Cih = L  (1 + 22)dih + FCih +ACih; (2)
where L = 1L1 + 2L2 is the expected repair cost, FCih is the expected cost of fraudulent
claims, and ACih is the expected audit cost. Thus L   (1 + 22)dih is the share of the
expected repair cost borne by the insurer, and FCih + ACih is the total cost of fraud. Let
us express FCih and ACih as functions of fraud and audit strategies. We have
FCih = qmih(1 + 2)(1  )
fqmb[(1  ih)(dih + v)  2ih(`  dih)]  (1  qmb)(`  dih)g: (3)
A policyholder who intends to renew his contract may try to defraud if his rst ac-
cident is minor and if it is in the non-suspicious period, which occurs with probability
qm(1 + 2)(1   ). He then postpones his claim with probability ih, and he will actu-
ally have the opportunity to defraud with probability qmb. In that case, fraud will be
detected with probability ih, and no insurance indemnity will be paid for the two minor
claims. With probability 1 ih, fraud is not detected and the additional cost to the insurer
is dih + v. If the policyholder does not have the opportunity to defraud (which occurs with
probability 1  qmb), he just loses the indemnity for the rst claim `  dih.
Furthermore, we have ACih = Nihci, where Nih is the number of audits per type h
policyholder for distribution channel i. Audits are concentrated on the rst claims that
27 If one single accident occurs, it is minor with probability qm and serious with probability qs, with costs `
and 2`, respectively . In the case of two accidents, both of them are minor with probability q2m and cost 2`, or
both are severe with probability q2s and cost 4`, or one is minor and the other one is serious with probability
2qmqs and cost 3`.
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correspond to serious accidents. Policyholders have at least one accident, the rst one being
serious, with probability qs(1 + 2). In addition, opportunistic policyholders who intend
to renew their contract le a fraudulent claim with probability q2mih2(1   ).28 Serious
accident claims are audited with probability ih. Thus, we have
ACih = Nihci = ihci[qs(1 + 2) + q
2
mih2(1  )]: (4)
The audit probabilitiy ih is chosen in [0; 1] by the insurer to minimize the expected cost of
claims Cih. We thus have ih = 1 - respect. ih 2 (0; 1); ih = 0 - if ih < ih - respect.
ih = 

ih; ih > 

ih- where 

ih = 
(dih; ci), with
(d; c)  qsc(1 + 2)
2q2m(1  )(2`  d+ v   c)
: (5)
ih is the threshold fraud rate such that the insurer is incentivized to audit claims if and
only if ih  ih. We have ih 2 (0; 1) if ci is not too large, and we focus attention on this
case in what follows.
At equilibrium, the decisions of the policyholder-repairer coalition and of the insurer
should be mutual best responses. The equilibrium is in mixed strategies: insurers audit
claims with a probability that makes the potential defrauder (here the policyholder-repairer
coalition) indi¤erent between defrauding and not defrauding, and symmetrically, the fraud
rate makes insurers indi¤erent between auditing and not auditing. This is stated in Propo-
sition 1.
Proposition 1 When insurers o¤er contract (Pi1; di1); (Pi2; di2) through i 2 fD;Ag, the
equilibrium fraud rates and the equilibrium audit strategies are ih = (dih; ci) and ih =
ih(Pih; dih), respectively.
Corollary 1 For any distribution channel i 2 fA;Dg, we have i1 > i2 i¤ di1 > di2, i.e.,
the larger the deductible, the larger the fraud rate.
28 Indeed, the policyholder has two minor accidents, the rst one in the non-suspicious period and the second
one in the suspicious period, with probability q2m2(1   ). He does not le a claim immediately after the
rst accident with probability ih.
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Corollary 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 because (d; c) is increasing in d.
The larger the deductible, the smaller the insurers incentives to audit the claim, and thus the
larger the minimal fraud rate that incentivizes the insurer to perform audits. In particular,
everything else given (and in particular for a given distribution channel), the model predicts
a larger fraud rate for deductible contracts than for full coverage contracts.
When ih = (dih; ci), the expected cost of an insurance policy purchased by type h
individuals through channel i is
Cih = L  (1 + 22)dih + k0(dih + k1)(dih; ci);
where k0 = qm(1 + 2)(1  ) 2 (0; 1) and k1 = qmbv + `(1  qmb). Insurers price their
contracts with the loading factor  > 0. Thus, we have
Pih = (1 + )Cih
= (1 + )[L  (1 + 22)dih + k0(dih + k1)(dih; ci)];
which may be written more compactly as
Pih = (dih; 
(di1h; ci));
where
(d; )  (1 + )[L  (1 + 22)d+ k0(d+ k1)]:
The equilibrium contract (Pih; dih) maximizes uh(P; d) subject to P = (d; (d; ci)), and
the equilibrium fraud rates are ih = (dih; ci) for h 2 f1; 2g,i 2 fA;Dg.
Proposition 2 The optimal insurance contracts are such that di1  di2  0, with di1 > di2
if di2 > 0 for i = A or D.
The extent of coverage is the result of a trade-o¤ between the incentives to audit claims
and the transaction costs, materialized by the fact that the fraud rate (d; c) is increasing in
d and by the loading factor , respectively. In the absence of transaction costs, overcoverage
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would be optimal.29 We have excluded overcoverage so that full coverage would be optimal
if there were no transaction costs. However, transaction costs reduce the optimal insurance
coverage. Type 1 individuals are less risk averse than type 2 individuals, and thus Proposition
2 states that their deductible is higher, as in the usual comparative statics of deductible
contracts (see Schlesinger (2013)). The trade-o¤ between increasing audit incentives and
reducing transaction costs may tip in favor of positive deductibles for type 1 and full coverage
for type 2, and in that case deductible and no-deductible contracts are simultaneously o¤ered
at equilibrium.30
Proposition 3 At equilibrium, we have D1 > A1; D2 > A2; that is, for both types
of individuals the fraud rate is larger among insurance policies purchased through D than
through A.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is the following. Insurers need additional incentives to audit
claims when insurance policies have been purchased through D than through A, because
establishing the truth is more costly in the rst case than in the second (i.e., cD > cA).
These additional incentives emerge when the fraud rate is higher, which corresponds to the
fact that (d; c) is increasing with c, hence at equilibrium there is a higher fraud rate for
D than for A. The proof of Proposition 3 shows that this basic intuition remains valid if we
take into account the fact that optimal deductibles may di¤er between both cases (i.e., we
may have dDh 6= dAh), which also a¤ect incentives.
There is a threshold xh 2 [0; 1] such that type h individuals located at x 2 [0; 1] choose
i = D if x < xh, and they choose i = A if x > x

h. We have Pih = (dih; ih) for i 2 fD;Ag.
Hence
uh((dDh; Dh); dDh)  txh = u1((dAh; Ah); dAh)  t(1  xh);
and thus the market share of D and A are characterized by the threshold
xh =
1
2
+
uh((dDh; Dh); dDh)  uh((dAh; Ah); dAh)
2t
;
29See Boyer (2004).
30See the illustrative example with mean-variance preferences after the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix
1.
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for h = 1; 2. Let us consider the case dA1> 0; dD1 > 0; dA2 = dD2 = 0, i.e., type 1 indi-
viduals chooose deductible contracts and type 2 individuals choose full coverage contracts,
because the former type is less risk averse than the latter. We have u1((dD1; D1); dD1) <
u1((dA1; A1); dA1) because cD > cA, which gives x1 < 1=2. Suppose that v is not large
enough to induce fraud by type 2 individuals. In this case, we would have D2 = A2 = 0,
and thus x2 = 1=2. The proportion of full coverage contracts among the contracts sold
through D and A are respectively
D =
2x

2
1x1 + 2x2
=
2
21x1 + 2
;
A =
2(1  x2)
1(1  x1) + 2(1  x2)
=
2
21(1  x1) + 2
;
and x1 < 1=2 gives D > A. We thus observe that fraud by type 1 policyholders causes a
distortion between distribution channels.
Proposition 4 If di1 > 0 and di2 = 0 for i = A;D and if v is not large enough to induce
fraud by type 2 individals, then the proportion of full coverage contracts is larger among
insurance policies purchased through D than through A.
4 The data
Our data comes from the largest insurance company in Taiwan, with an automobile insurance
market share of over 20%. Data is recorded at the individual level and provides detailed
information about the policyholders, their insurance contracts and the claims they have
led. Available variables are listed in Table 1. Data has been collected over the 2010-2012
period, but our analysis will be restricted to 2010, so that we know whether policyholders
subsequently renewed their contracts for less or more than one year. We target the owners
of private usage small sedans and small trucks with type A, B or C insurance contracts for
automobile physical damages. There are 109,461 policyholders, and 10.33% of them led at
least one claim in the year 2010, which corresponds to 11,248 observations. This subset
denes our "research sample" (i.e., the sub-sample of policyholders with claims).
(Insert Tables 1, 2-1 and 2-2 here)
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The mean values of the variables in the two samples are displayed in Table 2-1, with
some signicant di¤erences. In particular, the research sample includes a larger proportion
of female owners, medium-sized and new vehicles, with a larger share for one brand. More
importantly, the research sample includes a larger fraction of policyholders who belong to
the SG2 group and who have purchased insurance through the DOA channel than the whole
sample ( 5.68% vs 2.85%, and 79.98% vs 50.78%, respectively). The share of the RG group
also increases from 19.8% in the whole sample to 39.42% in the research sample. Table 2-2
separates the research sample into two subgroups, according to the insurance distribution
channels (DOA and non-DOA), with signicant di¤erences in terms of gender, usage, and
vehicle size. There is also a higher proportion of new vehicles for the DOA channel, which
reects the fact that DOAs sell both vehicles and insurance contracts. On average, the bonus-
malus coe¢ cient is signicantly higher in the DOA group than in the non-DOA group, but
insurance premiums do not signicantly di¤er between the two groups.31 Furthermore, the
percentage of insured parties who belong to the SG group is signicantly higher in the DOA
channel than in the non-DOA channel, for SG1 (70.29% and 51.78%, respect.) as well as
SG2 (6.35% and 3.01%, respect.) The percentage of claims led in the suspicious period
(dened as the last month of the policy year) is 54.66% in the non-DOA channel, and it
rises to 67.19% in the DOA channel. We may also observe that the share of the RG group
is signicantly lower in the DOA channel (34.28% vs 59.92%). Finally, the percentage of
no-deductible contracts sold through the DOA channel is larger than that in the non-DOA
channel (93.63% vs 91.34%).
31 It is indeed well known in Taiwan that individuals with less favorable claim records (and thus with a
higher bonus-malus coe¢ cient) tend to purchase insurance through a DOA, and that some DOAs may unduly
protect their customers from a strict enforcement of the bonus-malus rule.In Taiwan, a drivers bonus-malus
coe¢ cient is public information and thus, in principle, an insurance company should be in the position to
adjust the premium in each policy year even if policyholders switch from one insurance company to another.
However, in practice, for the sake of keeping customers or winning new customers, insurance companies
sometimes do not strictly enforce the bonus-malus rule. This is particularly the case when DOAs make use of
their bargaining power to act on behalf of their customers so as to protect them from an increase in premium.
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5 Testing hypotheses
Our rst hypothesis is related to the fact that the perspective of contract renewal and the
choice of a deductible contract are factors that stimulate fraud. Since we focus on the
fraudulent behavior that consists of manipulating the claim date by moving it to the end of
the policy year (possibly by ling one claim for two events), we dene the fraud rate as the
percentage of claims in the suspicious period.32
Hypothesis 1: The fraud rate is higher in the suspicious group than in the non-
suspicious group, and this is particularly the case for individuals covered by deductible con-
tracts.
According to Hypothesis 1, the policyholders from suspicious groups SG1 and SG2 have a
larger propensity to le a claim during the suspicious period than the other policyholders (the
control group). Testing this hypothesis amounts to identifying whether there is a conditional
dependence between belonging to the suspicious group SG (or to one of its subgroups SG1
and SG2), and ling a claim within the suspicious period (evaluated by the dummy SC). To
do so, we use a two-stage method, similar to the approach that has been followed by Dionne
et al. (1997, 2001) in a setting with asymmetric information about risk types.33
For notational simplicity, SG; SG1; SG2 also denote dummies for belonging to suspicious
groups SG; SG1 and SG2; respectively. Testing the conditional dependence between SG1
and SC and between SG2 and SC leads us to instrument two decisions at the rst stage.
One is the decision to renew the contract or not (SG = 0 or 1),34 and the other refers to the
contract choice (deduct = 0 or 1). These two decisions lead to the two endogenous variables:
SG1 =

1 if SG = 1 and deduct = 0;
0 otherwise.
;
SG2 =

1 if SG = 1 and deduct = 1;
0 otherwise.
32Of course, this does not mean that all the claims led in the suspicious period are fraudulent.
33They aim at appraising whether the correlation between claims and coverage reects individualsunob-
servable characteristics, which are not used by insurers in underwriting and pricing decisions. In order to
avoid a spurius correlation caused by misspecication, they add the conditional expectation of one decision
variable (such as ling a claim) when regressing on the other one (such as choosing the insurance coverage).
To avoid endogeneity problems, Dionne et al. (2009) and Dionne et al. (2014) estimate this conditional
expectation through an instrumental variable approach.
34We dene the suspicious group (SG) as the set of individuals who renew their contract at the end of the
policy year.
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SG and deduct are estimated at the rst stage by bivariate Probit regressions, with an
instrumental variable approach. This requires nding out some factors that are related to the
decisions of renewing the contract and choosing full coverage, in addition to the underwriting
and pricing variables, and that are unrelated to the decision of ling a suspicious claim.
Firstly, the income of an individual may a¤ect his decisions about the contract and about
his mobility between insurers, but there is no obvious reason for which income should be
related to the decision of ling a claim during the last policy month. The income level is
thus a rst candidate instrumental variable. Unfortunately, our database does not provide
information about the income level of each policyholder. As an approximation, we will
use a variable that corresponds to the average income level in the zip code area of the
policyholder. We will separate the wealthiest areas from the poorest ones through a dummy
variable incomei, indicating that insured i lives in an area where the average income is in
the top 25% tranche over the whole country.
Secondly, the insurance distribution channel may a¤ect the contract choice as well as the
renewal decision. In particular, DOAs own large market shares in Taiwan, they have tight
relationships with their customers, and they are in a favorable position to push customers to
renew their contracts and to choose more expensive no-deductible contracts. This potential
inuence of DOAs will be taken into account through the dummy variable dealeri, indicating
that individual i lives in a zip code area where the density of DOAs is in the top 25% tranche.
There is no obvious reason for which the propensity to le a claim during the suspicious period
would be a¤ected by the local density of DOAs, which leads us to treat dealeri as another
candidate instrumental variable.35
Accordingly, at stage 1 Bivariate Probit regressions are written as
Pr(SGi = 1jincomei; dealeri; Xi)
= (incincomei + ddealeri + Xi + "SGi); (6)
35Other thresholds (10%, 20%, 30% 40%, and 50%) have been tested, and it turned out that the 25%
criterion yields the best instrumental variable.
21
Pr(deducti = 1jincomei; dealeri; Xi)
= (incincomei + ddealeri + Xi + "dedti); (7)
cov("SGi; "dedti) = ; (8)
where Xi is the column vector of underwriting and pricing variables for policyholder i,
including: gender and age of the policyholder, usage, brand, size and age of the insured
vehicle. This is the rst group of explanatory variables in Table 1.
At stage 2, we estimate the probability that policyholders le their rst claim during
the suspicious period. We explore the conditional dependence between SC and SG1 and
between SC and SG2, by considering Pr(SG1i)  Pr(SGi = 1; deducti = 0) and Pr(SG2i) 
Pr(SGi = 1; deducti = 1) as explanatory variables in a second stage Probit regression, which
is written as
Pr(SCi = 1jPr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i); RGi; Xi)
= (instr1 Pr(SG1i) + instr2 Pr(SG2i) + rRGi + Xi); (9)
where SCi = 1 when policyholder i les his rst claim during the suspicious period and
SCi = 0 otherwise. To control for the possibility that last policy-month claims may result
from a premium recouping behavior, we also use the control variable RGi (with RGi = 1
when the contract is of type A or B and has not been subsequently renewed for more than
one year, and RGi = 0 otherwise). Here, also, Xi is the column vector that contains rst
group explanatory variables of Table 1.
Dionne et al. (2001) argue that the explanatory variables of stage 2 regression should
also include dummies for the variables instrumented at stage 1. We refer to this method as
the DGV approach. It leads to the following stage 2 regression:
Pr(SCi = 1jPr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i); SG1i; SG2i; RGi; Xi)
= (instr1 Pr(SG1i) + instr2 Pr(SG2i) + s1SG1i + s2SG2i + rRGi + Xi):
(10)
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In the 2SLS approach (regression (9)), the conditional dependence between SG1 and SC
as well as between SG2 and SC is evaluated through the estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG1i)
and Pr(SG2i), i.e., by instr1 and instr2, respectively. In the DGV approach (regression
(10)), the conditional dependence is evaluated by the overall sum of the estimated coe¢ cients
of Pr(SG1i) and SG1i and the sum of the estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG2i) and SG2i, i.e.,
by instr1 + s1 and instr2 + s2, respectively.
36
(Insert Table 3 here)
The rst stage bivariate Probit estimations are listed in the two rst columns of Table
3, with intuitive results. The inhabitants of higher income areas have a lower probability of
continuing the same contract, and a higher probability of purchasing a deductible contract.
This is consistent with a decreasing absolute risk aversion assumption: in a setting where
individuals may have partial information on the quality of insurance contracts, less risk
averse individuals are less reluctant to move from an insurer to another one, and they also
tend to choose lower coverage. Furthermore, inhabitants of high DOA density areas are more
likely to continue the same contract and their probability to choose a deductible contract is
lower, which is consistent with the presumption that DOAs tend to steer their customers in
a direction that is in their own interest. Policyholders from the premium recouping group
are less likely to continue the same contract for at least one year (which simply reects the
denition of RG), and they tend to opt for deductible contracts. We also see that the owners
of larger vehicles are comparatively more likely to renew their insurance contract and to opt
for a contract with a deductible.
The results of the second-stage estimation by the 2SLS approach with the Probit model
are reported in the third column of Table 3. They show the conditional dependence between
SC and either SG1 or SG2, with coe¢ cients 1:5688 and 2:0479 that are signicant at the 1%
level. The fourth column corresponds to the second stage of the DGV approach. The esti-
mated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG1) and Pr(SG2) are signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level,
36As a preliminary step, the 2SLS approach requires testing (1) whether there is a weak instrument problem
by the Anderson-Rubin test, (2) whether the instrument is over-identied by Sargans J test, and nally (3)
whether the instrumental variable method is relevant by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Dionne et al. (2014)
state that estimating the conditional probability of the instrumented variable through LPM or through the
Probit model is qualitatively consistent with the 2SLS approach. Estimating Pr(SGi = 1jincomei; dealeri; Xi)
and Pr(deducti = 1jincomei; dealeri; Xi) by two LPMs and performing these three tests validates our instru-
mental variable approach. The results of these tests are in Table 8 in the Appendix.
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which conrms the existence of an endogeneity problem. The dummy variables SG1 and
SG2 are also signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 5% and 1% threshold, respectively, which
conrms the conditional dependency between SC and SG1 or SG2, with total coe¢ cients
1:3591 = 1:0427 + 0:3164 and 2:1910 = 1:7074 + 0:4836, respectively.
Thus, the 2SLS and DGV approaches lead to similar conclusions, and they conrm our
presumption of a positive conditional dependence between belonging to SG1 or SG2 and
ling a rst claim during the suspicious period, which supports Hypothesis 1.
Remark 1: Table 3 also o¤ers some interesting byproducts that are worth mentioning.
Firstly, the owners of vehicles that are new or less than three years old tend to le their rst
claim during the suspicious period, which reects the "car wash" phenomenon in Taiwans
insurance market. Secondly, the policyholders from the premium recouping group also tend
to le their rst claims in the suspicious period, which echoes the conclusions of Li et al.
(2013). Thirdly, females also le their rst claim during the suspicious period more frequently
than males, but that does not necessarily reect a gender e¤ect in fraudulent behavior. It is
usual in Taiwan to register cars under the name of females (e.g., a wife or mother), even
when the primary driver is a male, in order to benet from cheaper insurance premiums.
Hence, instead of a gender e¤ect, the above mentioned correlation may just reect the fact
that the policyholders who carefully manage their insurance budget may also try to obtain
undue advantage from their insurance company.
For the sake of robustness verication, we have also followed the approach of Chiappori
and Salanié (2000). They use a pair of Probit regressions to explain the probability of ling
a claim and the probability of choosing partial coverage, and they appraise the conditional
dependence between these two variables by submitting the residuals of the two regressions
to a W test. Similarly, two sets of pairwise Probit regressions have been run. The rst ones
are performed among the policyholders who are either in SG1 or in neither SG1 nor SG2,
and they aim at estimating the conditional correlation between SG1 and SC. The second set
of pairwise regressions are performed among the policyholders who are either in SG2 or in
neither SG1 nor SG2, and they allow us to estimate the conditional correlation between SG2
and SC. Two W statistics, calculated with the residuals of the two regressions in each set,
are signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% threshold. We have also calculated the correlation
coe¢ cient of these residuals for each set, and nd that both are positive and signicantly
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di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level.37 Hence, the empirical results from this robustness test also
support to our Hypothesis 1.
If defrauders postpone their claims to the suspicious period and if they may cumulate
losses in a unique claim, then the suspicious period should be characterized by high values
of rst-claim cost ratios. This is expressed in Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: The rst-claim cost ratio is larger in the suspicious period than during
the rest of the policy year, particularly for the suspicious group.
Hypothesis 2 is tested through the following regression:
clmamti = cSCi + ffirsti + fsfirst  SCi + Xi; (11)
which is performed among the claims led by members of the SG group, where clmamti is
the value (in US dollars) of the claims led by policyholder i. In regression (11), we use two
additional variables (firsti and firsti  SCi) besides SCi and vector Xi. firsti = 1 when
this is the rst claim led by policyholder i during the policy year, otherwise firsti = 0 and
first  SCi is an interaction variable. We perform the above test separately for SG1 and
SG2. In our sample, this corresponds to 9,741 claims led by 7,489 policyholders from the
SG1 group, and 763 claims led by 639 policyholders from the SG2 group. The estimated
coe¢ cient of the interaction term bfs is the key to test. We obtain bfs = 149:37 with
p value 0.1014 for SG1, and bfs = 249:33 with p value 0.0658 for SG2. To some extent,
these results conrm the validity of Hypothesis 2, with a lower signicance level for SG1
than for SG2.38 To complete this verication, we run the regression that explains the
value of the claims over the whole sample (not only the SG group) by including dummies
SG1i; SG2i; SCi; firsti; and their double and triple interaction terms in the explanatory
variables. Furthermore, in order to be able to identify fraud (as dened above, that is claims
manipulation) and the premium recouping behavior, we also include RGi, and the double and
37Computing the W statistic with the residuals of the regressions for SG1 and SC yields W = 201:76,
which is signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level. The correlation coe¢ cient between the residuals of
these regressions is  = 0:003611, and it is also signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level. Likewise, using
the residuals from the regressions for SG2 and SC gives W = 257:99 and  = 0:03221, and these statistics
are signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level. The full regression results are not reported here because of
space constraints, but they are available from the authors upon request.
38This is consistent with the fact that the policyholders with deductible contracts (i.e., the SG2 subgroup)
have a greater incentive to le a unique claim for two events than the policyholders with no-deductible
contracts (the SG1 subgroup).
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triple interaction variables RGi  SCi, and RGi  SCi  firsti among explanatory variables.
clmamti = s1SG1i + s2SG2i + RGRGi + cSCi + ffirsti
+cfSCi  firsti + sf1SG1i  firsti + sf2SG2i  firsti
+RfRGi  firsti + sc1SG1i  SCi + sc2SG2i  SCi + RcRGi  SCi
+scf1SG1i  SCi  firsti + scf2SG2i  SCi  firsti
+RcfRGi  SCi  firsti + Xi: (12)
Performing this regression among the 14,797 claims led by the members of the research
sample gives bscf1 = 369:97 with p value <0.0154, bscf2 = 532:57 with p value <0.0001,
and bRcf =  10:11 with p value <0.0581.39 The inequalities bscf2 > bscf1 > 0 once again
validate Hypothesis 2. Symmetrically, bRcf < 0 conrms that members of the RG group
tend to le small claims at the end of the policy year, when they have not led any claim
during the previous months.
Remark 2: It is worth observing that these conclusions derived from regression (12)
should not be attributed to (ex ante) moral hazard or adverse selection. Ex ante moral hazard
explains why a more comprehensive insurance coverage may make a driver less cautious. This
incentive e¤ect is even stronger for policyholders who had no accidents before the suspicious
period, because the bonus-malus system forgives the rst accident. Hence, under the moral
hazard hypothesis, the policyholders from the SG1 group (i.e., those with a no-deductible
contract) should be less cautious than those from SG2 (the policyholders with a deductible
contract), and according to the moral hazard interpretation, they should have more severe
rst accidents in the last policy month. Regression (12) predicts exactly the contrary.
Let us investigate now how adverse selection may a¤ect our results. Firstly, in a setting
with hidden information about risk types, past and future claim experiences may be linked,
but man-made claim manipulation should reduce the predictive power of this link. To check
if this is actually the case, we use the 2010 data to run two Probit regressions that estimate
the probability of ling a claim either in any month of 2011 or in the suspicious period of
2011, respectively. The regressions were run separately for the suspicious and non-suspicious
groups.40 Observing the policyholders2011 claim records allows us to calculate the prediction
39The full estimated results of regressions (11) and (12) are available from the authors upon request.
40 In other words, these Probit regressions regress clmi and SCi, respectively, on the explanatory variables
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error for the claims led in all of 2011 and for the claims led in the suspicious period of
2011. In a second stage, we use a t-test to evaluate whether this prediction error is smaller
for the claims led over the whole year than for those led in the suspicious period.41 Panel
A of Table 4 conrms that this is the case, at the same time for both the suspicious and
non-suspicious groups. Furthermore, the di¤erence of the prediction error is signicantly
di¤erent and larger in absolute value in the suspicious groups, especially in SG2, than in the
non-suspicious group. This conrms the manipulation of claims, beyond any possible hidden
information about policyholdersrisk types.
Secondly, we know that adverse selection may lead to a positive correlation between the
contract coverage and the probability of ling claims, but it does not induce any particular
timing for claims such as the one on which we are focusing. Panel B of Table 4 provides
the hazard rate in the suspicious groups SG1 and SG2, and in the non-suspicious group.
In SG1 and SG2, the hazard rates are signicantly higher in the last policy month than
in the other months, and these last month hazard rates are signicantly higher than in the
non-suspicious group, which conrms that claim manipulation does occur. The fact that the
last month hazard rate is even larger for SG2 than for SG1 conrms that our observations
cannot be attributed to adverse selection.
(Insert Table 4 here)
Remark 3: We may also be worried by the fact that SG2 includes two types of deductible
contracts, with more extensive exclusions for type B than for type A. To control for any
disturbances that may be linked to this di¤erence in the scope of coverage, we perform a
robustness test, in which we limit our sample to type-B contracts.42 The empirical results
are listed in Table 5. Basically, the results are consistent with those of Table 3, which conrms
the robustness of our results.
(Insert Table 5 here)
Beyond the mere fact that fraud does exist, estimating its cost is also important. To
included in the vector of observable variables Xi.
41The prediction error is the absolute value of the di¤erence between the estimated probability of ling a
claim and the dummy equal to 1 if the individual has led a claim in 2011 and 0 otherwise. We calculate the
di¤erence between the prediction errors over the whole 2011 year and over the suspicious period, and we test
whether this di¤erence is negative.
42 In other words, in this test, the suspicious group includes the policyholders (from the SG1 group) with
a no-deductible type B contract that has been renewed at the end of the policy year, and the policyholders
(from the SG2 group) with a deductible type B contract that has been renewed at the end of the policy year,
while the control group contains the other policyholders with a type B contract that has not been renewed.
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do this, we refer to the empirical results from the DGV model. The estimated coe¢ cients
of Pr(SG1) and SG1 are 1:0427 and 0:3164 (see the fourth column in Table 3), and their
marginal e¤ects are 0:3806 and 0:1155, respectively. This implies that, overall, the probability
of ling a claim in the suspicious period increases by 49:61% when comparing a policyholder
from the SG1 group to those in the non-suspicious group. The average cost of non-detected
fraudulent claims is NT$5; 027 if we presume that fraud is committed by ling a unique claim
for two events, postponed to the last month of the policy year to avoid the penalty from the
bonus-malus rule.43 This implies that the di¤erence in annual fraud cost between members
of the SG1 group and policyholders from the non-suspicious group is about NT$2; 494.
Likewise, the estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG2) and SG2 are 1:7074 and 0:4836, with marginal
e¤ects 0:6232 and 0:1765, respectively, which implies that the probability of ling a claim
in the suspicious period increases by 79:97% when we compare members of the SG2 group
to policyholders from the non-suspicious group. The average cost of a fraudulent claim is
NT$10; 027, once again with the assumption that defrauders le a unique claim for two
events and postpone their claim to the last month of their policy year.44 This implies
that the policyholders from the SG2 group entail an expected cost of fraud that is about
NT$8; 019 higher than for the insured from the non-suspicious group. Since there are 7; 489
and 639 policyholders in SG1 and SG2, respectively, we may deduce that the expected cost
of fraud is about NT$23; 801; 707, which represents 8:74% of the total premiums paid by the
policyholders from our sample (NT$2:724 billion). These are of course very crude estimates,
but they give an idea of the cost of fraud through claims manipulation in Taiwan.
Our third hypothesis is inspired by Proposition 3; it relates the fraud rate to the insurance
distribution channel.
Hypothesis 3: The fraud rate in the suspicious group is comparatively even larger
when insurance has been purchased through the DOA channel than through other distribution
channels.
43The average insurance premium in our research sample is NT$ 25,136. We may roughly estimate that the
defrauders who le a unique claim for two events and postpone their claim to the last month of their policy
year avoid about 20% of this amount: 10% because of the decrease in the number of claims, and 10% because
the increase in premium will be postponed for one year.
44This cost includes the avoided deductible and the avoided bonus-malus penalty. The deductibles of rst
and second claims are NT$3; 000 and NT$5; 000 respectively, hence there is a NT$5; 000 fraud cost when
policyholders le a unique claim to cover two accidents. Adding the NT$5; 027 avoided penalty due to the
increase in premium to the deductible of the second claim yields a total fraud cost of NT$10; 027.
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Testing the validity of Hypothesis 3 will follow the same approach as for Hypothesis
1. Dummy Di indicates that policyholder i has purchased insurance through the DOA
channel, and now three endogenous variables, SGi; deducti and Di; must be instrumented
in the 2SLS approach. As previously, SGi and deducti are instrumented by incomei and
dealeri through bivariate Probit regressions, leading to SG1i = Pr(SGi = 1; deducti = 1)
and SG2i = Pr(SGi = 1; deducti = 0): Furthermore, dealeri and incomei are also candidate
instruments for Di, because a large DOA density may be an encouragement to purchase
insurance from a DOA, and because people with high income may have larger search costs,
which may lead them to purchase insurance from a DOA. This is particularly the case when
individuals purchase a new car, hence a third instrumental variable newi, which indicates
that the insured vehicle is less than three years old. Thus, Di is instrumented by:
Pr(Di = 1jincomei; dealeri; newi; X2i)
= (icmincomei + ddealeri + newnewi + X2i): (13)
Stage 2 of the 2SLS approach is now written as:
Pr(SCi = 1jPr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i);Pr(Di); RGi;Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i);Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i);Pr(Di) RGi; X2i)
= (instr1 Pr(SG1i) + instr2 Pr(SG2i) + D Pr(Di) + rRGi
+Dinstr1 Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i) + Dinstr2 Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i) + Dr Pr(Di) RGi + X2i);
(14)
with Pr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i), and Pr(Di)  Pr(Di = 1) being estimated at stage 1. In par-
ticular, we include interaction terms Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i) and Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i) in order to
evaluate whether the conditional dependence between SG1 and SC and between SG2 and
SC are comparatively higher in the DOA channel. The premium recouping e¤ect and its
interaction with the DOA channel are also taken into account through RGi and Pr(Di)RGi,
respectively.
At Stage 2 of the DGV approach, the explanatory variables include the dummy variables
SG1i; SG2i and the two estimated variables Pr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i), with interaction terms to
assess whether the conditional dependence between SG1 and SC and between SG2 and SC
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is a¤ected by the DOA channel. This is written as:
Pr(SCi = 1jPr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i); SG1i; SG2i;Pr(Di); RGi;
Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i);Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i);Pr(Di)  SG1i;Pr(Di)  SG2i;Pr(Di) RGi; X2i)
= (instr1 Pr(SG1i) + instr2 Pr(SG2i) + S1SG1i + S2SG2i + D Pr(Di) + rRGi
+Dinstr1 Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i) + Dinstr2 Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i) + DS1 Pr(Di)  SG1i
+DS2 Pr(Di)  SG2i + Dr Pr(Di) RGi +X2i):
The results are in Table 6.45 The rst column lists the estimated coe¢ cients of the rst
stage regression for Pr(D): they conrm that individuals living in areas with high average
income and high DOA density tend to purchase insurance through the DOA channel. This
is also the case for the owners of vehicles that are less than three years old.
The 2SLS and DGV Probit regressions for SC are in the second and third columns. In
the 2SLS Probit model, the estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG1) and Pr(SG2) are 0:6843 and
1:0644, and they are signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
The estimated coe¢ cients of SG1  Pr(D )and SG2  Pr(D) are 1:0477 and 1:1005, and
they are signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1 % level. All in all, this conrms that there
is a signicant conditional dependence between belonging to the suspicious group and ling
claims during the suspicious period. This conditional dependence is even stronger among
the insured who have purchased insurance through the DOA channel, and these e¤ects are
stronger for SG2 than for SG1. In other words, we may conclude that the fraud phenomenon
associated with the claim date manipulation does exist, and that it is more severe among
those individuals with deductible contracts and who have purchased insurance through the
DOA channel, which conrms the prediction from Hypothesis 3.
(Insert Table 6 here)
The third column of Table 6 corresponds to the DGV model. The most relevant results
are the following. The estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG2) and SG2 are equal to 0.8930 and
0.1930, with signicance level 1% and 10%, respectively, and an overall e¤ect of 1.0860. The
45Here we have also checked the robustness of our IV method by using two sets of 2SLS-LPM and by
checking that the null hypothesis of irrelevant model is rejected by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the null
hypothesis of exogenous instrumental variable cannot be rejected by the Anderson-Rubin test, and the null
hypothesis of no-over identication cannot be rejected by the J test.
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estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG1) and SG1 are equal to 0.4762 and 0.0845, respectively, but
the second one is not signicant. The coe¢ cients of interaction terms Pr(D)  Pr(SG1) and
Pr(D)  Pr(SG2) are equal to 0.7134 and 0.9773 and they are signicant at the 1% level.
Similar conclusions are obtained for Pr(D)  SG1 and Pr(D)  SG2, with signicance levels
of 10% and 5%, respectively. It is particularly interesting to observe that each coe¢ cient in
the DOA channel is larger than its equivalent in the non-DOA channel, which conrms the
role of DOAs in the fraud process. Furthermore, whatever the distribution channel, the SG2
coe¢ cients are larger than their SG1 equivalents, which conrms that deductible contracts
exacerbate fraudulent behaviors.
Calculation shows that the marginal e¤ect of the estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(Di) SG1i
and Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i) are equal to 0:1016 and 0:2517, which implies that, in the SG1
group, the probability of ling a claim during the suspicious period is 35.33% larger when
policyholders have purchased insurance through the DOA channel than through another
channel. Thus, if the expected cost of a fraudulent claim by an SG1 policyholder is NT$5; 027,
as we have already estimated, then the expected fraudulent claim cost of such policyholders
is NT$1; 776 larger when insurance has been purchased through the DOA channel than
through another channel. The marginal e¤ect of the estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(Di)  SG2i
and Pr(Di)Pr(SG2i) are equal to 0:1214 and 0:3448, thus with a 46.62% larger probability
of ling a claim in the suspicious period for a member of the SG2 group who has purchased
insurance through the DOA channel rather than through another channel. For an expected
cost of fraudulent claims in the SG2 group equal to NT$10; 027, this amounts to an increase
of NT$4; 675 in the expected cost of fraud when an SG2 policyholder takes out insurance
from a DOA rather than through another distribution channel.
At the end, we may calculate the increase in fraud cost for each suspicious subgroup
by comparison with the non-suspicious group. For example, 6; 323 policyholders in SG1
have taken out insurance through the DOA channel, with an expected increase in fraudu-
lent claiming of NT$2; 770, and hence a total additional cost of NT$17; 514; 710. Similar
calculations for the other cases yield the following results:46
46 In our research sample, 571 individuals from the SG2 group have taken out insurance from DOAs. There
are 1,166 and 68 members in the Non-DOA group, for SG1 and SG2 respectively.
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Increase
in the cost of fraud
DOA Non-DOA
SG1 6; 323 2; 770 = $17; 514; 710 1; 166 994 = $1; 159; 004
SG2 571 8; 517 = $4; 863; 207 68 3; 842 = $261; 256
SG1 + SG2 $22; 377; 917 $1; 420; 260
Hence the suspicious policyholders in SG1 and SG2 who have purchased insurance
through the DOA channel are at the origin of an increase in the cost of fraud that can
be estimated at NT $22; 377; 917, which corresponds to about 8.22% of the premium writ-
ten by this company for this line of business. The estimated increase in fraud cost is only
$1; 420; 260, that is 0.52% of the premium written.
A legitimate question that may arise is whether the higher expected cost of claims in
the DOA channel comes from fraudulent behaviors, as we have argued so far, or whether it
rather reects the fact that, on average, the individuals who take out insurance from DOAs
have higher risks. This issue may be claried by estimating the claim amount using the
following OLS regression:
claimamti = 0+DDi+AAi+BBi+DADi Ai+DBDi Bi+XiX + "i: (15)
Ai and Bi are dummies for type A or B contracts, respectively, with type C contract as
counterpart, and Xi includes the underwriting and pricing variables as in the previous re-
gressions. The estimated results are in Table 7. Type A and B contracts are associated with
claim costs that are signicantly larger than for type C contracts. The estimated coe¢ cient
of Di is negative, but it is not signicantly di¤erent from 0. Likewise, the estimated coe¢ -
cients of interaction terms Di Ai, and Di Bi are not signicantly di¤erent from 0. In other
words, the policyholders of the DOA channel do not have higher claim costs than others,
whatever their contract. Hence, the increase in claim costs is not an intrinsic characteristic
of the distribution channel: it reects the fraudulent behaviors of some policyholders (the
suspicious groups) who may take advantage of the manipulation of claims, and this behavior
is facilitated by DOAs.
Remark 4: Apart from these main results, Table 6 also provides two interesting by-
products that are common to the 2SLS and DGV Probit models. Firstly, the estimated
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coe¢ cient of RGi is positive and signicantly di¤erent from 0, at least at the 10% level,
which conrms the existence of the premium recouping behavior. However, the estimated
coe¢ cients of the interaction term RGi Pr(Di) have negative signs that are not signicant.
Thus, compared to other distribution channels, DOAs do not particularly help opportunistic
policyholders to recoup premiums at the end of the policy year. Their behavior, as an act of
collusion, rather focuses on the manipulation of the claim date. Secondly, the estimated co-
e¢ cient of femalei is positive and signicant. This conrms that fraudulent behaviors may
be widespread among those individuals who carefully manage their budget, since the declared
gender of the owner of the car may be manipulated to take advantage of a lower premium.
This is consistent with our previous observation made regarding Table 3.
Hypothesis 4: The proportion of no-deductible contracts is larger when contracts are
sold through the DOA channel.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 reects Proposition 4. We test this hypothesis by using the whole
sample (not only the subsample of policyholders with claims). In a rst step, we estimate the
probability of choosing the DOA channel (i.e., Pr(Di)) by regression (13), and in a second
step we test the following regression:
Pr(nodedti = 1jPr(Di); Bi; X2i) = (D Pr(Di) + BBi + X2i); (16)
where nodedti = 1 when policyholder i chooses a no-deductible contract, and nodedti = 0
otherwise. Contracts may also di¤er through di¤erent exclusions, and the additional dummy
Bi is used to control for this heterogeneity. Estimation gives bD = 1:2499, with a p value
smaller than 0.0001, which conrms the validity of Hypothesis 4.
We may also control for the unobservable heterogeneity between individuals, particularly
in terms of risk type through a two-stage method. In the rst stage, we test
Pr(clmi = 1jincomei; dealeri; newi; X2i)
= (icmincomei + ddealeri + newnewi + X2i); (17)
where clmi = 1 if individual i has led a claim and clmi = 0 otherwise. In the second stage,
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we use the DGV model to control for unobservable heterogeneity. This is written as :
Pr(nodedti = 1jPr
i
(clmi); clmi;Pr(Di); Bi; Xi)
= (ec Pr(clmi) + cclmi + D Pr(Di) + BBi + Xi); (18)
where Pr(clmi)  Pr(clmi = 1) and Pr(Di) is the estimated probability of choosing the
DOA channel. We obtain bD = 1:0111 with a p value smaller than 0.0060, which once
again conrms the previous result, but at a lower signicance level.
6 Conclusion
This paper has focused attention on the policyholder-service provider coalition in insurance
mechanisms: how it can a¤ect the credibility of claim auditing, how several patterns of fraud
may emerge in the car insurance market, and how service providers and policyholders may
draw benet from such a coalition. The important role of car dealers in Taiwan provides
an exceptional opportunity to analyze this interaction between insurer, policyholder and
provider.
Indeed, the economic analysis of insurance fraud is usually based on a very abstract
picture of claims fraud (ling a fraudulent claim although no accident has occurred, or
exagerating a claim), but in practice understanding insurance fraud often requires a much
more specic analysis of the claims fraud process. The Taiwan case o¤ers such a possibility,
with fraud frequently taking place through the manipulation of the claims date in order
to avoid a penalty from the bonus-malus system and to reduce the burden of a second
deductible, should another accident occur.
On the theoretical front, we have analyzed how claim monitoring is a¤ected by the
collusion between policyholders and car repairers, how deductible contracts and the specic
rules of the Taiwanese bonus-malus regime may be incitements to fraud, and how fraud may
induce distortions in the proportions of deductible and no-deductible contracts depending on
the distribution channel. On the empirical front, we have established that the intertemporal
manipulation of claims was actually a signicant determinant of insurance fraud in Taiwan.
In particular, we have shown that policyholders with deductible contracts who intend to
renew their policies (the suspicious group) have a larger propensity to defraud than other
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policyholders, by postponing their claims until the last month of the policy year, and possibly
by merging two events into a single claim. Consequently, there is an increase in the average
cost of rst claims led by the suspicious group in the last month of the policy year. We
have also shown that the collusion between policyholders and DOAs is a crucial mechanism
that contributes to the development of fraud in the Taiwanese car insurance market. Finally,
we have also shown that such mechanisms induce a distortion toward a lower proportion
of deductible contracts among the DOAscustomers than among individuals who purchase
insurance through other distribution channels.
Our analysis has made progress toward a more complete analysis of claims fraud be-
havior, but it also opens new perspectives for further research. The theoretical modelling
could be rened, for instance, by considering a more realistic set of possible losses (say a
continuum instead of two levels) or by analyzing the intertemporal distribution of claims in
a more satisfactory way than considering each subperiod (suspicious and non-suspicious) as
a whole. It would also be of great interest to analyze the insurer-car repairer vertical rela-
tionship (including vertical integration) which would be the most e¢ cient when there is a
risk of fraud and collusion. Finally, insurance fraud is just one case where collusion induces
additional transaction costs in the vertical relationships between producers and retailers.
Other examples include discount fraud and warranty fraud. More theoretical and empirical
research is required to evaluate the costs associated with such fraudulent behaviors, and to
better understand how they can be detected and prevented most e¢ ciently.
References
Alger I. and C. A. Ma (2003), "Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion", Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 50 (2): 225-547.
Bourgeon, J-M., P. Picard and J. Pouyet (2008), "Providersa¢ liation, insurance and
collusion", Journal of Banking and Finance, 32:170-186.
Boyer, M. (2004), "Overcompensation as a partial solution to commitment and renego-
tiation problerms: the case of ex post moral hazard", Journal of Risk and Insurance, 71(4):
559-582.
Dionne, G. and R. Gagné R.(2001), "Replacement cost endorsement and opportunistic
fraud in automobile insurance", Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 24: 213-230.
35
Dionne, G., C. Gouriéroux and C. Vanasse (1997), The informational content of household
decisions with application to insurance under adverse selcetion", Manuscript. Montreal:
Ecole Hautes Etudes Commerciales.
Dionne, G., C. Gouriéroux and C. Vanasse (2001), "Testing for evidence of adverse
selection in the automobile insurance market : a comment", Journal of Political Economy,
109(2) : 444-453
Dionne G., P. St-Amour and D. Vencatachellum (2009), "Asymmetric information and
adverse selection in Mauritian slave auctions", Review of Economic Studies, 76 (4): 1269-
1295.
Dionne, G., M. La Haye and A. S. Bergeres (2014) "Does asymmetric information a¤ect
the premium in mergers and acquisitions?" Canadian Journal of Economics (forthcoming)
Fukukawa, K., C. Ennew and S. Diacon (2007), "An eye for an eye : investigating the
impact of consumer perception of corporate unfairness on aberrant consumer behavior", in
Insurance Ethics for a more Ethical World (Research in Etical Issues in Organizations),
edited by P. Flanagan, P. Primeaux and W. Ferguson, Vol.7, 187-221, Emerald Group Pub-
lishing Ltd.
Gal-Or, E. (1997), "Exclusionary equilibria in health care markets", Journal of Eco-
nomics and Management Strategy, 6: 5-43.
Gouriéroux, C., A. Monfort (1995), "Statistics and econometric models", Cambrdige
University Press, 2: 458475.
Harris, L.C. and K. Daunt (2013), "Managing customer misbehavior: Challenges and
strategies", Journal of Services Marketing, 27(4): 281-293.
Li, C-S., C-C. Liu and S-C. Peng (2013), "Expiration dates in automobile insurance
contracts : The curious case of last policy month claims in Taiwan", Geneva Risk and
Insurance Review, 38(1): 23-47.
Li, C-S., C-C. Liu and J-H. Yeh (2007), "The incentive e¤ects of increasing per-claim
deductible contracts in automobile insurance", Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74(2): 441-
459.
Ma, C.A. and T. McGuire (1997),"Optimal health insurance and provider payment",
American Economic Review, 87(4): 685-704.
Ma, C.A. and T. McGuire (2002), "Network incentives in managed health care", Journal
36
of Economics and Management Strategy, 11(1): 1-35.
Mayer, D. and Jr. C. S. Smith, (1981), "Contractual provisions, organizational structure,
and conict control in insurance markets", Journal of Business, 54: 407-434.
Miyazaki, A.D. (2009), "Perceived ethicality of insurance claim fraud : do higher de-
ductibles lead to lower ethical standards", Journal of Business Ethics, 87(4):589-598.
Murphy, K. M. and R.H. Topel (2002), "Estimation and inference in two-step econometric
models", Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 20 (1).
Murthy, D.N.P. and I. Djamaludin (2002), "New product warranty: A literature review",
International Journal of Production Economics, 79, 231-260.
Picard, P. (1996), "Auditing claims in insurance market with fraud: the credibility issue",
Journal of Public Economics, 63: 27-56.
Pratt, J. (1964), "Risk aversion in the small and in the large", Econometrica, 32: 122-136.
Rey, P. (2003), "The economics of vertical restraints", in Economics for an Imperfect
World, Essays in Honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz, R. Arnott, B. Greenwald, R. Kanbur and B.
Nalebu¤ (eds), MIT Press, 247-268.
Schlesinger, H. (2013), "The theory of insurance demand", Handbook of Insurance, 2nd
Edition, G. Dionne (Ed), Springer, 167-184.
Tennyson, S. (1997), "Economic institutions and individual ethics : a study of consumer
attitudes toward insurance fraud", Journal of Economics Behavior and Organization, 32:247-
265.
Tennyson, S. (2002), "Insurance experience and consumersattitudes toward insurance
fraud", Journal of Insurance Regulation, 21(2):35-55.
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1
If ih > 

ih, then the optimal choice of the policyholder is ih = 0 < 

ih, which gives
ih = 0 for the optimal choice of the insurer, hence a contradiction. Symmetrically, if
ih < 

ih, then the optimal choice of the policyholder is ih = 1 > 

ih, which gives ih = 1
for the optimal choice of the insurer, hence once again a contradiction. Thus we necessarily
have ih = 

ih 2 (0; 1) at equilibrium. ih = ih is an optimal choice of the insurer if
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ih = 

ih. Symmetrically, ih = 

ih 2 (0; 1) is an optimal choice of the policyholder if
ih = 

ih. Thus ih = 

ih; ih = 

ih is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let the expected utility of type h = 1; 2 policyholders who purchase insurance through
i = A;D be written as euih(d)  uh((d; (d; ci)); d); where (:) and (:) are dened by
(d; ) = (1 + )[L  (1 + 22)d+ k0(d+ k1)];
(d; c) = Kc(2`  d+ v   c) 1;
with K  qs(1 + 2)=2q2m(1  ). Let
ei(d)  (d; (d; ci)):
We have
e0i(d) = (1 + )[ (1 + 22) + k0(d; ci)
+k0(d+ k1)Kc(2`  d+ v   c) 2];
e00i (d) = 2Kck0(1 + )(2`  d+ v   c) 3(2`+ v   c+ k1) > 0:
Thus, we have
euih(d) = (1  1   2)uh(w   ei(d)) + 1uh(w   ei(d)  d  ")
+2uh(w   ei(d)  2d  2");
eu0ih(d) =  (1  1   2)u0h(w   ei(d))e0i(d)
 1u0h(w   ei(d)  d  ")(1 + e0i(d))
 2u0h(w   ei(d)  2d  2")(2 + e0i(d)):
Using e00i (d) > 0 and u00h < 0 shows that euih(d) is a concave function. Let dih be the optimal
deductible for type h individuals, i.e., dih maximizes euih(d) with respect to d  0. Assume
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rst that di1 > 0, which implies eu0i1(di1) = 0 and e0i(di1) < 0 . We have
eu0i2(di1) =  (1  1   2)u02(w   ei(di1))e0i(di1)
 1u02(w   ei(di1)  di1   ")(1 + e0i(di1))
 2u02(w   ei(di1)  2di1   2")(2 + e0i(di1)):
Since type 2 individuals are more risk averse than type 1 individuals, we know from Pratt
(1964) that there exists a function g : R  ! R such that u2(y)  g(u1(y)), with g0 > 0 and
g00 < 0. This allows us to write
eu0i2(di1) =  (1  1   2)g0(u1(y0))u01(y0)e0i(di1)
 1g0(u1(y1))u01(y1)(1 + e0i(di1))
 2g0(u2(y2))u01(y2)(2 + e0i(di1));
where y0 = w   ei(di1); y1 = w   ei(di1)   di1   " and y2 = w   ei(di1)   2di1   2", with
y2 < y1 < y0. Let us rst consider the case where 1 + e0i(di1) > 0. Let y 2 (y1; y0). Using
g00 < 0 and u01 > 0 yields
g0(u1(y0)) < g0(u1(y)) < g0(u1(y1)) < g0(u1(y2)):
Using e0i(di1) < 0 < 1 + e0i(di1) then gives
eu0i2(di1) < g0(u1(y))eu0i1(di1) = 0;
which implies di2 < di1 because of the concavity of eui2(d). Similarly, when 1+ e0i(di1) < 0 <
2 + e0i(di1), we let y 2 (y2; y1) and a similar argument also yields di2 < di1. Similarly, if
di1 = 0, we have eu0i1(0)  0, and the same argument gives eu0i2(0) < 0 and thus di2 = 0.
Example with mean-variance preferences
The case di1 > 0; di2 = 0 can be conveniently illustrated by a mean-variance example.
Assume that u1(wf ) and u2(wf ) are quadratic, so that we may write
uh(wf ) = E(wf )  hV ar(wf );
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with 2 > 1. When insurance is purchased through distribution channel i, we have
E(wf ) = w   e0i(d)  (1 + 22)(d+ ");
V ar(wf ) = I(d+ ")
2;
with I = 1(1  1) + 42(1  1   2) > 0. We have dih > 0 i¤
 e0i(0)  (1 + 22)  2hI"2 > 0;
and thus we have di1 > 0; di2 = 0 if
1 < 
 < 2;
where
 =
1
2I"2
 [(1 + 22)
 (1 + )k0Kc(2`+ v   c) 2(2`+ v   c+ k1)]:
Proof of Proposition 3
Let
uh((d; ); d)   h(d; ):
Let us write the equilibrium fraud rate as
(d; c) = Kc(2`  d+ v   c) 1;
with K  qs(1 + 2)=2q2m(1   ). Assume uh((d; (d; c)); d) =  h(d; (d; c)) is
maximized w.r.t. d at d = bdh(c) with fraud rate bh(c)  (bdh(c); c). Thus, we have
ih = bh(ci)  (bdh(ci); ci) for i 2 fA;Dg. The rst-order and second-order optimality
conditions for this maximization are respectively written as
Fh   0hd +  0h
@
@d
= 0; (19)
40
and
Sh   00hd2 +  00hd
@
@d
+  00h2

@
@d
2
+  0h
@2
@d2
< 0; (20)
where  0hd; 
0
h; 
00
hd2 ; 
00
hd; 
00
h2 denote rst and second derivatives of  h and all functions
are evaluted at d = bdh(c). Di¤erentiating (19) gives
bd0h(c) =  F 0hcSh ;
where
F 0hc =
@Fh
@c
=  00hd
@
@c
+  00h2
@
@c
@
@d
+  0h
@2
@d@c
:
After simplication we get
b0h(c) = @@d bd0h(c) + @@c
= (1=Sh)

 0h

@2
@d2
@
@c
  @
2
@d@c
@
@d

+  00hd2
@
@c

: (21)
We have
@
@d
= Kc(2`  d  c) 2;
@
@c
= K(2`  d  c) 1 +Kc(2`  d  c) 2;
@2
@d2
= 2Kc(2`  d  c) 3;
@2
@d@c
= K(2`  d  c) 2 + 2Kc(2`  d  c) 3:
Hence
@2
@d2
@
@c
  @
2
@d@c
@
@d
= K2c(2`  d  c) 4 > 0:
Furthermore,
 h(d; ) = (1  1   2)uh(w   (d; ))
+1uh(w   (d; )  d) + 2uh(w   (d; )  2d):
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(d; ) is linear in d, and thus  h(d; ) is concave in d, which implies  00hd2 < 0. We also
have
 0h =
@uh
@P
@
@
< 0:
Using (21) and  0h < 0; 
00
hd2 < 0; @
=@c > 0 then yields b0h(c) > 0. Thus, we have
D1 = b(cD) > b(cA) = A1.47
47Note that if transaction costs prevent insurers from o¤ering contracts with deductibles that depend on
the distribution channel, i.e., if we assume dA1 = dD1  d1, then the fraud rates are D1 = (d1; cD) >
(d1; cA) = A1, and the proposition is obviously still valid.
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Appendix 2
In this appendix, we show how the bargaining power of the policyholder-repairer coalition
a¤ects the scale of fraud. The bargaining power of the colluders is taken into account in a very
crude way by assuming that the defrauders will not be punished with probability i 2 (0; 1),
with i = D or A. Intuitively, the insurance agent is incentivized to stand up for its customer
(and possibly also for the repairer in the case of a DOA that owns the repair shop), and
it may threaten the insurer to redirect its customers toward another insurer. This may
deter the insurer from enforcing the penalty. A larger bargaining power for D than for A
corresponds to D > A. Thus, if the colluders are spotted (which occurs if the claim is
audited), then with probability 1 i the penalties are enforced (no indemnity is paid by the
insurer and the colluders pay the nes B and B0, respectively, and with probability i the
insurer interprets the fraud as an involuntary error, i.e., the policyholder receives the total
cumulated contractual indemnity 2(`  dih) and no nes are paid. Under these assumptions,
a type h policyholder with two minor accidents and a repairer are willing to defraud (with
the policyholder making a side-payment G to the repairer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis) if
EuFih  EuNih (22)
and
G  ih(1  i)B0  0; (23)
respectively, with
EuFih = qmb[(1  ih)uh(w   Pih   dih   2"+ v  G)
+ih(1  i)uh(w   Pih   2`  2" G B) + ihiuh(w   Pih   2dih  G)]
+(1  qmb)[buh(w   Pih   `  dih   2") + (1  b)uh(w   Pih   `  ")]:
Fraud is deterred (i.e., ih = 0) if ih > 

ih where 

ih(Pi1; dih; i) is the value of ih
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such that
EuFih = Eu
N
ih with G = ih(1  i)B0:
Since defrauders who are caught are not punished with probability i, the expected
actuarial cost of a deductible insurance policy is now written as
FCih = qmih(1 + 2)(1  )
fqmb[(1  ih)(dih + v)  2ih(1  i)(`  dih)]
 (1  qmb)(`  dih)g: (24)
The equilibrium audit and fraud strategies are ih = (dih; ci; i) and ih = 

ih(Pih; dih; i),
with
ih(dih; ci; i) 
qsci(1 + 2)
2q2m(1  )[(1  )(2`  dih) + id+ v   ci)
; (25)
which can be interpreted in the same way as (5) in Section 3.4 and extends Proposition 1
in a straightforward way. The equilibrium contract (Pih; dih) maximizes uh(P; d) subject to
P = (d; (d; ci; i)), and the equilibrium fraud rates are ih = (dih; ci; i) for i = A
or D. In the same way as in the proof of Proposition 3, we can then show that Dh > Ah
if cD = cA and D > A. To establish this result, we make the additional assumption D <
1=2.48 The denition of (d; ) is unchanged, and we still denote  h(d; )  uh((d; ); d).
 h(d; 
(d; c; )) is maximized w.r.t. d at d = edh(c; ) with fraud rate eh(c; ) 
(edh(c; ); c; ). The equilibrium fraud rates are ih = eh(ci; i)  (edh(ci; i); ci; i)
for i 2 fA;Dg. We have (similarly to the proof of Proposition 3, with an unchanged deni-
tion for Sh):
48For a given fraud rate ih, the decrease in actuarial cost dCih < 0 induced by a small increase in the
audit probability dih > 0 is dCih =  q2mih[dih + 2(1  i)(`  dih)]dih. We consider the case where the
decrease in cost is larger when the deductible is lower, which requires i < 1=2.
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@e(c; )
@
=
@
@d
@ edh(c; )
@
+
@
@
= (1=Sh)

 0h

@2
@d2
@
@
  @
2
@d@
@
@d

+  00hd2
@
@

: (26)
We have (d; c; ) = Kc[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 1, and thus
@
@d
= Kc(1  2)[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 2;
@
@
= 2Kc(`  d)[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 2;
@2
@d2
=  2Kc(1  2)2[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 3;
@2
@d@
=  2Kc[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 2   4Kc(1  2)(`  d)[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 3:
Hence,
@2
@d2
@
@
  @
2
@d@
@
@d
= 2K2c2(1  2)[(1  )(2`  d) + d  c] 4 > 0: (27)
Using Sh < 0; 0h < 0; 
00
hd2 < 0; @
=@ > 0; (26) and (27) yields @e(c; )=@ > 0. Thus,
we have Dh = e(c; D) > e(c; A) = A1 when cD = cA = c and D > A.
Appendix 3
(Insert Table 8 here)
As shown in Table A1, the p-values of the Anderson-Rubin test in the two rst-stage
LPMs are 0.4732 and 0.3820, respectively, and the null hypothesis of the exogenous instru-
mental variable cannot be rejected. Secondly, the p-values of the J test in these two LPMs
are 0.3066 and 0.1591, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are
not over identied either. Thirdly, the p-values of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in these two
LPMs are 0.0220 and 0.0420, respectively, and we can reject the null hypothesis that the
instrumental variable method is irrelevant at the 5% level for each instrumented variable.
All in all, this conrms the properness of our IV approach. Table A1 also yields some by-
products: policyholders living in high income areas and in areas with a high density of DOAs
signicantly tend to renew their contracts and to choose policies with deductibles, which is
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consistent with the results obtained in the 2SLS approach.
The second stage regressions show that ling a suspicious claim and continuing the con-
tract (or choosing a deductible contract) are conditionally dependent decisions, with a pos-
itive signicant dependence. The estimated coe¢ cient of Pr(SG) is 1.5457, and it is signif-
icantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level. The estimated coe¢ cient of Pr(deduct) is 1.2647,
and it is also signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level, which indicates that policyholders
who renew their contracts and have chosen a deductible contract have a larger propensity to
le claims during the suspicious period.
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Figure 1:  Distribution of claims and average claim cost (first claims) 
in the policy year 
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Figure 2:  Distribution of the first claims in the calendar year 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
First claims (Unit:%)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Distribution of all claims in the calendar year 
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Figure 4:  Average cost of first claims / Average cost of all claims 
Comparing the suspicious group and type C contracts 
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Figure 5:  Distribution of claims in the policy year 
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Table 1: 
Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Explained variable: 
SG Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured belongs to the “suspicious group”,1 and 
0 otherwise. 
SG1 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured belongs to “suspicious group 1”,2 and 0 
otherwise. 
SG2 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured belongs to “suspicious group 2”,3 and 0 
otherwise. 
nodedt Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured has taken out a no-deductible contract, 
and 0 otherwise. 
SC Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured has filed his or her first claim during the 
suspicious period (in the last policy month), 0 otherwise. 
Explanatory variables: First group (underwriting and pricing factors) 
female Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured is a female, 0 otherwise. 
age2025 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured is in the 20-25 age group, 0 otherwise. 
age2530 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured is in the 25-30 age group, 0 otherwise . 
age3060 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured is in the 30-60 age group, 0 otherwise. 
ageabv60 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured is older than 60, 0 otherwise. 
carage0 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is less than one year old, 0 otherwise. 
carage1 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is two years old, 0 otherwise. 
carage2 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is three years old, 0 otherwise. 
carage3 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is four years old, 0 otherwise. 
carage4 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is more than four years old, 0 otherwise. 
veh_m Dummy variable equal to 1 when the capacity of the insured car is between 1800 and 
2000 c.c., 0 otherwise. 
veh_l Dummy variable equal to 1 when the capacity of the insured car is larger than 2000, 0 
otherwise. 
                                                 
1
 The “suspicious group” (SG) includes the individuals who renew their contract with the same 
insurance company. The counter group for SG includes the policyholders who do not renew their 
contract with the same insurance company. 
2
 The “suspicious group 1” (SG1) includes the policyholders with no-deductible contract who renew 
their contract with the same insurance company. The counter group for SG1 includes the policyholders 
with deductible contract or who do not renew their contract with the same insurance company. 
3
 The “suspicious group 2” (SG2) includes the policyholders with deductible contract who renew their 
contract with the same insurance company. The counter group for SG2 includes the policyholders with 
no-deductible contract or who do not renew their contract with the same insurance company.  
tramak_j Dummy variable equal to 1 when the brand of the insured car is j, with j=n, f, h, t, c, 
and 0 otherwise.4 
sedan Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is a sedan and is for non-commercial or for 
long-term rental purposes, and 0 otherwise.5 
logprem Logarithm of the premium of the contract in the current contract year. 
bonus Bonus-malus coefficient used to calculate the premium in the current contract year. It 
is a multiplier on the premium. Hence, it is a discount if it is smaller than 1 and it is a 
penalty if it is larger than 1. 
 
Explanatory variables (Second group): 
income     Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured lives in an area with average income in the 
top 25% tranche, and 0 otherwise. 
dealer     Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured lives in an area with DOA density in the top 
25% tranche, and 0 otherwise. 
new       Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured car is less or equal to three year old, and 0 
otherwise. 
logprem    Logarithm of the premium of the contract in the current contract year. 
 
D Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurance contract is sold through the DOA channel, 
and 0 otherwise. 
A Dummy variable equal to 1if the insured is covered by a type A contract, and 0 
otherwise. 
B Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured is covered by a type B contract, and 0 
otherwise.6 
RG Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured belongs to the “recoup group”,7 and 0 
otherwise. 
                                                 
4
 The insured cars in counter group for tramak_j, j= n, f, h, t, c , are other brands (other than Nissan, 
Ford, Honda, Toyota, and China.) 
5
 The counter group includes the insured cars are not small sedan, for example small or large truck, 
cargo…etc. 
6
 The contracts in the counter groups for A and B are type C contracts. 
7
 The “recoup group” includes the policyholders covered by type A or B contracts who do not renew 
their contract or renew it for only one year. 
Table 2-1: 
Structure of the full sample and of the sub-sample with claims 
 
 Full sample 
(1) 
Sub-sample with 
claims (2) 
Difference 
(2)-(1) 
claim 0.1033   
SC  0.6468  
RG 0.1980 0.3942 0.1962*** 
nodedt 0.9514 0.9317 -0.0167*** 
A 0.0103 0.0140 0.0037*** 
B 0.3882 0.8876 0.4994*** 
SG 0.7179 0.7226 -0.1262*** 
SG1 0.6894 0.6658 -0.0236*** 
SG2 0.0285 0.0568 0.0283*** 
D 0.5078 0.7998 0.2920*** 
female 0.7118 0.7600 0.0482*** 
age2025 0.0032 0.0028 -0.0004 
age2530 0.0342 0.0464 0.0122 
age3060 0.8947 0.8929 -0.0018 
ageabv60 0.0679 0.0579 -0.0100 
carage0 0.2192 0.5116 0.2924*** 
carage1 0.1381 0.2023 0.0705*** 
carage2 0.0915 0.0642 -0.0273*** 
carage3 0.1109 0.0665 -0.0444*** 
carage4 0.0986 0.0438 -0.0548*** 
veh_m 0.2875 0.2256 -0.0619*** 
veh_l 0.2692 0.2696 0.0004 
tramak_n 0.0069 0.0057 -0.0012 
tramak_f 0.0609 0.0586 -0.0552 
tramak_h 0.0805 0.0531 -0.0274 
tramak_t 0.4692 0.6262 0.1570*** 
tramak_c 0.0415 0.0120 -0.0295 
sedan 0.9166 0.9398 0.0232 
logprem 9.2346 10.0632 0.8286*** 
bonus 0.7180 0.8773 0.1593*** 
No of obs. 109,461 11,248 
 
 

 Table 2-2: 
 Structure of the DOA and non-DOA subsamples 
 
 DOA 
(1) 
Non-DOA 
(2) 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
SC 0.6719 0.5466 0.1253*** 
RG 0.3428 0.5992 -0.2564*** 
nodedt 0.9363 0.9134 0.0229*** 
A 0.0118 0.0226 -0.0226*** 
B 0.9345 0.7003 0.2342*** 
SG 0.7664 0.5479 0.2185*** 
SG1 0.7029 0.5178 0.1851*** 
SG2 0.0635 0.0301 0.0334*** 
female 0.7698 0.7207 0.0491*** 
age2025 0.0027 0.0036 -0.0009 
age2530 0.0472 0.0431 0.0041 
age3060 0.8938 0.8890 0.0048 
ageabv60 0.0562 0.0644 -0.0082 
carage0 0.5953 0.1776 0.4177*** 
carage1 0.2000 0.2118 -0.0118 
carage2 0.0581 0.0884 -0.0303*** 
carage3 0.0517 0.1257 0.0740*** 
carage4 0.0326 0.0888 -0.0562*** 
veh_m 0.2093 0.2904 -0.0811*** 
veh_l 0.2621 0.2993 -0.0372*** 
tramak_n 0.0043 0.0111 -0.0068*** 
tramak_f 0.0485 0.0990 -0.0505*** 
tramak_h 0.0411 0.1008 -0.0597*** 
tramak_t 0.6962 0.3464 0.3498*** 
tramak_c 0.0026 0.0497 -0.0471*** 
sedan 0.9532 0.8863 0.0669*** 
logprem 10.1650 9.6565 0.5085 
bonus 0.9110 0.7426 0.1684*** 
No of obs. 8,996 2,252 
 
 
 Table 3: 
 Empirical evidence of fraud  
 
 First stage (bivariate Probit) Second stage 
 
SG deduct 2SLS-Probit DGV-Probit 
constant 1.4264*** -1.7669*** 0.2160 0.0735 
Pr(SG1) 
  
1.5688*** 1.0427*** 
Pr(SG2) 
  
2.0479*** 1.7074*** 
SG1
 
   
0.3164** 
SG2
 
   
0.4836*** 
income  -0.0752** 0.3093*** 
  
dealer 0.0161*** -0.1339*** 
  
RG -2.0748*** 0.3028*** 1.0057*** 0.1517*** 
female 0.0941*** -0.1455*** 0.0847*** 0.0821*** 
age2530 0.2405 0.3783  -0.2256  -0.2375  
age3060 0.2930 0.1659  -0.1790  -0.1920  
ageabv60 0.0973 0.1112  -0.3126  -0.3187  
carage0 0.4225*** 0.0570** 0.2332*** 0.2513*** 
carage1 0.1009* 0.0440* 0.1966*** 0.1944*** 
carage2 0.1192 -0.0603  0.2427*** 0.2404*** 
carage3 0.1052 -0.0768  0.2076*** 0.2067*** 
carage4 0.0425 -0.0313  0.0552  0.0555  
veh_m 0.0127 0.0147  -0.0097  -0.0100  
veh_l 0.1046*** 0.2310*** -0.0557* -0.0605* 
sedan -0.0350 0.2751*** -0.0201 -0.0200 
Pseudo  0.0542 0.0451 0.0465 
 
Notes 
(1) In the above models Pr(SG1i) and Pr(SG2i) are the estimated probabilities of belonging to the 
suspicious groups SG1 and SG2, respectively, calculated at the first stage, that is Pr(SG1i)= 
Pr(SGi=1, deducti=0), and Pr(SG2i) = Pr(SGi=1, deducti=1). In the DGV-Probit model, SG1 and 
SG2 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the policyholder belongs to the suspicious groups SG1 and 
SG2, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
(2) In all the above regressions, we have also controlled for the brand of the insured car. This is not 
reported for reasons of confidentiality. 
(3) ***,** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
(4) We have also performed two sets of the 2SLS-LPM to confirm the validity of our IV model. In both 
sets, the null hypothesis of irrelevant model is rejected by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the null 
hypothesis of exogenous instrumental variable cannot be rejected by the Anderson-Rubin test, the null 
hypothesis of no over identification cannot be rejected by the J test. 
 Table 4: 
Additional evidence of fraud  
 
 SG1 SG2 non-SG 
 Panel A: Predicted errors 
filing a claim 0.1201 0.1213 0.1330 
filing SC 0.3072 0.3969 0.2639 
t test -130 (<0.0001) -170 (<0.0001) -31.3673 (<0.0001) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Baseline hazard in each policy month 
1st month  - - 
2nd month  - 0.00003 
3rd month  - 0.00003 
4th month  - 0.00003 
5th month  - 0.00003 
6th month 0.000002  0.00003 
7th month 0.0001 0.0003 0.0015 
8th month 0.0021 0.0019 0.0024 
9th month 0.0033 0.0042 0.0041 
10th month 0.0055 0.0104 0.0069 
11th month 0.0191 0.0326 0.0345 
12th month 0.0538 0.0874 0.0457 
 
Table 5:  Empirical evidence of fraud - Focus on type B contracts  
 First stage (bivariate probit) Second stage 
 
SG deduct 2SLS-Probit DGV-Probit 
constant 1.2881*** -1.8345*** 0.7050** 0.6609** 
Pr(SG1) 
  
1.3076*** 1.0288*** 
Pr(SG2) 
  
1.9137*** 1.6741*** 
SG1
 
   
0.2407** 
SG2
 
   
0.3573*** 
income  -0.0610*** 0.3272*** 
  
dealer 0.0172* -0.0966** 
  
RG -2.9190*** 0.1962*** 1.0022*** 0.1487*** 
female 0.1065*** -0.1667*** 0.0828*** 0.0822*** 
age2530 0.3279  0.7018  -0.3714  -0.3701  
age3060 0.3536  0.4452  -0.3829  -0.3814  
ageabv60 0.0529 0.3848  -0.5057  -0.5007  
carage0 0.8014*** -0.0019  0.2920*** 0.0150  
carage1 0.1876** -0.0781  0.1607*** 0.1603***  
carage2 -0.1434  -0.1629  0.1543*** 0.1557*** 
carage3 -0.0972  -0.2115  0.0981 0.0985  
carage4 -0.2555  -0.0338  -0.0446  -0.0424  
veh_m 0.0339  0.0078  -0.0338  -0.0326  
veh_l 0.0642* 0.0351  -0.0951*** -0.0945*** 
sedan 0.0448 0.1995** -0.0281 -0.0278 
Pseudo  0.0521 0.0352 0.0373 
 
Same notes as in Table 3
 Table 6: 
Empirical evidence of fraud through DOAs 
 
 
First stage  
(Instrument on D)   
Second stage 
 
2SLS-Probit DGV-Probit 
constant -0.1944 0.0969 -0.1910 
Pr(SG1) 
 
0.6843* 0.4762* 
Pr(SG2) 
 
1.0644** 0.8930*** 
SG1
 
  
0.0845 
SG2
 
  
0.1930* 
Pr(D) 
 
1.3660*** 1.6798*** 
Pr(D)*Pr(SG1) 
 
1.0477*** 0.7134*** 
Pr(D)*Pr(SG2) 
 
1.1005*** 0.9773*** 
Pr(D)*SG1
 
  
0.2881* 
Pr(D)*SG2
 
  
0.3440** 
income 0.3093* 
  
Dealer 0.2620* 
  
New 0.5340*** 
  
RG 0.1275*** 1.0639** 0.3197* 
Pr(D)*RG  -0.0836 -0.2415 
Female 0.0268  0.0824** 0.0814** 
age2530 0.1329  -0.4295  -0.4267  
age3060 0.2840  -0.4573  -0.4583  
ageabv60 0.3450  -0.5888* -0.5892* 
carage0 0.8864*** -0.4331*** -0.4375*** 
carage1 0.3564*** -0.2948*** -0.2953*** 
carage2 0.2942*** -0.1725* -0.1704* 
carage3 0.1691* -0.0441  -0.0423  
carage4 0.0751 -0.1690* -0.1642* 
veh_m -0.0172  -0.0343  -0.0370  
veh_l -0.1211*** -0.0689** -0.0680** 
Sedan 0.2634*** -0.1268* -0.1305* 
Pseudo  0.2213 0.0450 0.0560 
Same notes as in Table 3 
 
  
Table 7:   
Comparing the policyholders’ risk between the DOA and non-DOA channels 
 
Variables  Est. Ceoff. P value 
Intercept 23.2634 0.4353 
D -1.8105 0.3308 
A 17.6766 0.0001 
B 4.1090 0.0050 
D*A 1.7407 0.7093 
D*B 1.6078 0.6758 
Female -2.0447 0.0028 
age2025 4.0914 0.8924 
age2530 1.3474 0.9639 
age3060 -5.8571 0.0097 
ageabv60 1.4598 0.9609 
carage0 0.2970 0.7804 
carage1 1.6699 0.1395 
carage2 1.4368 0.3232 
carage3 3.4444 0.0147 
carage4 3.6011 0.0264 
veh_m 2.8894 0.0001 
veh_l 12.6377 <.0001 
sedan 10.6254 <.0001 
Adjusted  0.0605 
Note: In the above regression, we have also controlled the brand of the insured car. The results are not 
reported for reasons of confidentiality. 
 
Table 8:  
Empirical results from 2SLS-LM 
 
 2SLS-LPM 
 
SG SC deduct SC 
constant 0.9114*** 9.7965*** 0.0654 0.0956 
Pr(SG)  1.5457***   
Pr(deduct)    1.2647*** 
income  -0.0326*  0.3541***   
dealer 0.0622**  -0.1790***  
RG -0.6093*** 0.1829*** 0.0362*** 0.1977*** 
female 0.0213*** 0.3130 *** -0.0183*** 0.1126*** 
age2530 0.0487  0.2796  0.0597  -0.3104  
age3060 0.0603  0.4492  0.0308  -0.2286  
ageabv60 0.0112  -0.2022  0.0246  -0.3570  
carage0 0.1186*** 1.0114*** 0.0060* 0.2330*** 
carage1 0.0166  0.3753** 0.0044  0.1922*** 
carage2 0.0200  0.4569** 0.0070  0.2509*** 
carage3 0.0144  0.3641** -0.0096  0.2208*** 
carage4 -0.0011  0.0441  0.0001  0.0523  
veh_m 0.0036  -0.0271  0.0026 -0.0096  
veh_l 0.0229*** -0.1785*** 0.0244*** -0.0978*** 
sedan 0.0043 0.0716 0.0371*** 0.0798 
J test 0.3066  0.1591  
Anderson-Rubin test 0.4732  0.3820  
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.0220  0.0420  
Pseudo/Adjusted  0.4570 0.0510 0.0713 0.0420 
 
